

MAY 1960

# ***CURRENT***

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***THE SIGNIFICANT NEW MATERIAL***

***FROM ALL SOURCES***

***ON THE FRONTIER PROBLEMS OF TODAY***

## HOW TO READ CURRENT

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## CURRENT'S AFFAIRS

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In pre-publication soundings, our editorial commitment—to present the significant new material from all sources on the frontier problems of the day—evoked widespread approval, even some enthusiasm.

Quite often it also evoked skepticism: How are we going to get this done?

We are aware of the challenge: At one end of our editorial process is the reader—the concerned citizen—with limited time and unlimited conscience. At the other end is the raw material—vast and varied and never-ending—which dwarfs and frustrates the hapless citizen. Can any staff reduce this mass to a size and form the concerned citizen will want to read each month?

We think we can. After all, few goals are absolutely attainable. No newspaper contains all the news, no encyclopaedia includes all knowledge, no artist knows all truth. We simply hope that, in the process of striving for our goal, we perform a useful function.

What makes the task viable is our determination to reduce the mountain of material by concentrating on "frontier problems." This is a phrase we invented to characterize the kind of problem that we think the concerned citizen is concerned with.

A frontier problem, we feel, has three characteristics. It has a fundamental relationship to our democratic way of life; it takes into account the newest scientific knowledge; it involves unanswered questions.

We do not seek (or deprecate) material that is "best" or satisfying to "all tastes" or specifically useful for any purpose other than concerned citizenship. We admit being impatient, however, with trivia and irrelevance that masquerades as portentous utterance.

Our editorial pipeline is fed by two main sources. One is our group of consulting editors who are experts in various fields. They evaluate specialized material and make recommendations. The other is the mass of general material that flows directly into our office.

Having determined that a piece of material deals with a frontier problem, we then apply as rigorously as we can our criteria for selection: the material should contain new information or new ideas, be noteworthy for its source, or be a suggestive reformulation of a known position.

When it passes this test, we determine whether each item is best handled by verbatim quotation, paraphrasing, condensation, or a combination of these techniques.

The process of editorial distillation continues until we are down to 64 pages. Our final decision deals with how much we need say in introducing the material to our readers. We can only guess. We prefer to obtrude ourselves as little as possible. Our editorial contribution is to select and organize the material. If we do this well, the material should speak for itself.

We will come closer to our goal if our readers help. We will be glad to learn of things we have missed and we welcome our readers' reactions to what we select and the way we present it.

SIDNEY HERTZBERG

# CURRENT

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# THE SEARCH FOR NATIONAL PURPOSE

## CRITICS OF THE PRESIDENT

The ongoing discussion of national purpose found a temporary focus on President Eisenhower's long response to a press conference question on Feb. 3. Commentator Edward P. Morgan had asked about America's lag behind the Soviet Union in technical, economic and educational achievement.

Walter Lippmann summarized the President's answer as follows:

"Mr. Eisenhower's philosophy, if I have understood correctly his impromptu remarks, is that our security is not in jeopardy and that if the Soviet Union is moving faster than we are in the development of certain elements of national power, that is to be expected and must be accepted. For, said Mr. Eisenhower, 'let's remember that dictatorships have been very efficient.' If we must achieve a 'greater tempo' in our development of national power, we shall have to 'take our country and make it an armed camp and regiment it . . . and get people steamed up like you did in wars.' . . . Mr. Eisenhower delivered a little lecture on how we should think and talk more about the 'values . . . which we do believe'—namely 'our own individual freedoms and rights.' He went on to say that 'our people ought to have greater faith in their own system.' By this he seemed to mean that the critics who think our defenses are inadequate and the critics who say that we are neglecting our children and not keeping up with the needs of our population have less faith than he has in our 'system.'"

Mr. Lippmann, who twice supported Eisenhower's Presidential candidacy, then writes:

Walter Lippmann

"With all due respect, Mr. Eisenhower is mistaken. It is he who lacks faith in our system. It is he who is saying that we cannot meet the Soviet challenge without changing our system and giving up our freedom. It is he who is telling the country that it cannot afford to meet the needs of our rapidly growing and increasingly urbanized population. It is he who is saying that with a 500 billion dollar economy, the American nation will lose its freedom if it devotes to public purposes a somewhat larger share than it does today. It is he who is saying that our system of liberty is so fragile that it is not tough enough and durable enough to keep up the pace in the great contest of national power.

"Again, with all due respect, he has sunk into, he has resigned himself to, an attitude of defeatism in which there is no faith that our people have the will, the energy, the resourcefulness, and the capacity to close ranks, if they are summoned to make a greater effort. Mr. Eisenhower is talking like a tired old man who has lost touch with the springs of our national vitality.

"The doctrine which the President holds, the doctrine which determines his budget, his program, and his preaching to the nation is, in the perspective of the world struggle, a most dangerous doctrine. The central issue of the world struggle is whether the Soviet system or a liberal system can deal best with the problems that beset mankind. In that struggle we shall surely lose if we tell the world that, though we have the richest economy in all history, our liberal system is such that we cannot afford a sure defense and adequate provision for the civil needs of our people." (New York Herald Tribune, Feb. 9, 1960)

**A Dozen  
Intellectuals**

Time asked "a dozen prominent U.S. intellectuals" to comment on the President's remarks, and reports:

"Only one, the University of Chicago's Professor F. A. Hayek, agreed with him. Said Hayek, author of *The Road to Serfdom* and *The Constitution of Liberty*: In the achievement of any particular goal that is already visible, an unfree society will often out-perform a free society. But in the long run, intellectual progress depends not so much upon solution of already visible problems as upon 'the appearance of new vistas and approaches, on exactly those unforeseeable developments for which freedom provides the opportunity.'

"All the others took issue with the President. Paul Weiss (*Man's Freedom*), Yale professor of philosophy, argued that 'there is more to the achievement of the good than mere awareness of its desirability. It cannot be achieved without overcoming of obstacles and conquest of evil.' Editor Norman Podhoretz of the Jewish magazine *Commentary* agreed with the President that 'in the long run' men will choose freedom—if they are permitted a choice. But by the time men are ready to make the 'long-run' choice, 'the Communists may already have won the political and military struggle.' Harvard historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. (*The Coming of the New Deal*) added sharply: 'The reason we are falling behind lies in the lack of purpose in our national life. We are promoting private prosperity at the expense of national strength.'

"In time, said Sidney Hook (*Marx and the Marxists*), New York University professor of philosophy, the desire for freedom in Communist countries may become so strong that genuine representative governments will emerge, but that can only come about if in the meantime the U.S. exerts the effort required to cope with communism's 'permanent state of mobilization against the free world.' Harvard's Henry A. Kissinger (*Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*) thought that freedom would not prevail 'if we continue to confuse freedom with passivity and peace with lassitude.'

"The President got perhaps his best answer from Lionel Trilling (*The Liberal Imagination*), Columbia professor of English and comparative literature: 'Perhaps it is true that in the long run—in the very long run—men learn to value personal liberty above everything else. But that time seems not yet to have come for the people of the disadvantaged nations of the world. Many of them do not have a tradition of personal liberty, and they imagine it far less readily than they imagine national prestige and power, social order and economic efficiency. And indeed the grim fact seems to be that the example of Russia leads many of them to believe that prestige, power, order and efficiency are most easily achieved precisely by sacrificing liberty. It will need an intense and very intelligent effort on the part of the U.S. to convince them that this is not so.' " (*Time*, Feb. 15, 1960)

*The chief of The New York Times Washington bureau comments on a later Presidential utterance.*

**James Reston**

"President Eisenhower believes with great sincerity that the 'active, reformist' concept of the Presidency has gone too far. As he told the reporters [on March 17]: 'I am one of those who believe there is too much interference (by the Federal Government) in our private affairs. . . . I would like to diminish rather than increase it.'

"For this reason, he would leave the question of eating in private establishments in the South to the local authorities; he would leave the allocation of the nation's resources primarily to private choice, rather than increase the flow of funds into education, hospitals, and defense.

"He would leave the development of Latin America primarily to private venture capital (which takes one look at Castro and flees) and avoid any direction of television, no matter what commercial television does to debase the national taste.

"He believes in the noble theory which Jefferson proclaimed (and didn't always follow)—but will it work in the Sixties? Will the local communities really make peace at the lunch counters, or vote the funds to provide the education necessary in this kind of world? Will private capital voluntarily develop the underdeveloped countries in freedom, or give us educational television?

"There are a lot of people here who honestly think the answer to these questions is 'no.' They understand the conservative limitation of Presidential power in a period of consolidation. But they think the President, one hundred years after Appomattox, ought to be willing to say at least a word for the Negro trying to eat a hamburger next to a white man in Atlanta, and they insist that the next President, whoever he is, will need to use all his powers to meet the problems of the Sixties." (*The New York Times*, Mar. 18, 1960)

*A Washington columnist says that both the President's "critics and his hero-worshippers" are puzzled by his continued popularity in public opinion polls, and suggests the reason for it.*

**Marquis Childs**

"There is nothing in the least mysterious about it. The President is saying just what most of his fellow-citizens want to hear. This is that we are spending enough to give the nation security in all the areas that really matter; that our freedoms and our spiritual values give us an edge that is bound to keep us ahead of atheistic, materialistic communism. We are prosperous and if only the Congress follows the Eisenhower budgetary formula we should have a surplus this year with a possible tax cut next year.

"From the sounding board of the White House, far and away the most powerful amplifier in the country, that is the philosophy constantly reiterated. It is expressed by a friendly, warm-hearted man whose homely and often awkward and imprecise use of the English language, far from offending the average citizen, probably serves to endear him more.

"Add to this that the critics of the missile and space programs are divided as to what is wrong and what to do about it. The result is a confusion of tongues, echoing the President's press conference remark that there are too many generals around here with all sorts of ideas, most of them parochial in viewpoint. Going behind the headlines involves exploration of a world the average reader must feel is beyond him. After all, the President should know." (Feb. 10, 1960)

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## THE ASSAULT ON PRIVATE LUXURY

**Christian A. Herter**

"We have, of late, been too absorbed, I feel, in the mere enjoyment of a prosperous life behind our defensive curtain of nuclear power. We must realize instead that the fateful competition with communism has placed a first claim on the energy and interests of us all. That means subordinating our private interests to the paramount public interest. It also means using our economy less for the things which do not really matter, and more for the things which do—for the uses which would train and inform our minds, promote the health of our society and keep our country free." (Address, Nov. 16, 1959)

**Senator  
J. W. Fulbright**

"Where do we stand? We stand today a nation with prodigious resources, able to afford private luxuries incomparable in history, but trailing the Soviet Union in science, space, armament, and most recently the Winter Olympics. Rich in the private sector of our economy, we are poor in the public sector, and we will get poorer if we follow the admonition of our Secretary of Commerce, who branded any politician as 'irresponsible' or an 'economic illiterate' if he were to try to 'drain from the blood stream of the private economy the savings urgently needed . . . for growth.' . . .

"[The American people] must be told, too, that however humane their society, whatever its ideals, this alone will not save them from destruction by a society armed with the prodigious mechanisms of our times and an implacable determination to dominate all men. . . .

"The people must be told, too, that it will not be enough simply to react to the Soviet threat and to clean our domestic Augean stables. Goals we must have to which we and mankind may aspire. And once the goals are clarified we must have the fortitude and the patience and the means to attain them.

"It is the duty of the President of the United States to inform the people. It is also his high privilege—if he avails himself of it—to call the people, so to speak, up to the hill of the Lord and tell them what will be exacted of them if they seek salvation on this earth against extinction or slavery." (*Congressional Record*, Mar. 5, 1960)

**George F. Kennan**

"If you ask me—as a historian, let us say—whether a country in the state this country is in today: with no highly developed sense of national purpose, with the overwhelming accent of life on personal comfort and amusement, with a dearth of public services and a surfeit of privately sold gadgetry, with a chaotic transportation system, with its great urban areas being gradually disintegrated by the headlong switch to motor transportation, with an educational system where quality has been extensively sacrificed to quantity, and with insufficient social discipline even to keep its major industries functioning without grievous interruptions—if you ask me whether such a country has, over the long run, good chances of competing with a purposeful, serious, and disciplined society such as that of the Soviet Union, I must say that the answer is 'no.' " (Address, Oct. 22, 1959)

*Professor Schlesinger of Harvard University projects a new period in American politics.*

**Arthur M.  
Schlesinger Jr.**

"It is the contention of this memorandum that the Eisenhower epoch—the current period of passivity and acquiescence in our national life—is drawing to a natural end."

After the exertions of the New Deal, World War II, and the Cold and Korean Wars the American people wanted normalcy, and Eisenhower came along to fill this bill. "His function was to justify political apathy—to make indifference to politics respectable." But this apathy was to have several unfortunate consequences: in the past eight years we have produced no good new political ideas, we have fallen behind in matters of defense, our economic growth has slowed down, our "public sector" has deteriorated, and many of our traditions of civil liberties have been violated.

It is probable that a cyclical pattern explains the political history of democratic nations like the United States—periods of great innovation and achievement alternating with periods of quiescence. Certainly there are now numerous signs of hostility to the Eisenhower "normalcy."

The quality  
of life

"The condition of national exhaustion is evidently coming to an end. Batteries are being recharged; there is a gathering of forces underneath the surface."

Because the new period which seems to be on the point of arriving is not the reaction to an economic catastrophe, it will not necessarily resemble the New Deal. More probably the motivating force will be the clamor of people who dislike the way that the American *community* is being neglected. "I suspect that a revival of a new sense of the *public interest* will be central to the new period."

The essential issue here is "*the allocation of resources between the private and public sectors of the economy*...."

"It should always be recalled that the point in developing a new conception of the public interest and in producing a consequent reallocation of resources is *not* that these things are adequate ends in themselves, or that strengthening the national government is *per se* a good thing. The point is to bring about a higher quality of life and opportunity for ordinary men and women.

"This point—the *quality* of life—suggests the great difference between the politics of the Sixties and the politics of the Thirties. The New Deal had to cope with immediate problems of subsistence and survival. Its characteristic issues were those involved in refueling the economic machine, raising mass living standards, setting minimum wages, pegging farm prices, vindicating collective bargaining, establishing systems of social security. Its emphasis was essentially *quantitative*. This emphasis was inevitable in an age of scarcity. But the basic condition has changed. Today we dwell in an economy of abundance. Instead of the quantitative liberalism of the Thirties, rightly dedicated to the struggle to secure the economic basis of life, we need now a '*qualitative liberalism*,' dedicated to bettering the quality of people's lives and opportunities...."

"As we renew a fighting national faith in combatting the defects and inequities of our own society, we will generate an enthusiasm that will reverberate across the world. Nothing would go farther to restore world confidence in American leadership and purpose than a resumption of forward motion in our own society.... Speaking realistically, we probably will not have affirmative vigor and faith in our foreign policy until we get moving again in our national society." ("The Shape of National Politics to Come," *The Progressive*, September 1959. Available through Readers Service)

The Guardian

"There is no denying that the United States still faces many difficult problems—different from, but not necessarily less serious than, the problems of the past...."

"But if these problems exist, we should not forget that they have also been brilliantly analyzed, and that the same society which produced the problems also produced the analysts. It may be true that America in the 1950s has been less of an inspiration to the rest of the world than she was in the 1930s and 1940s. But after all, the New Deal and the assumption of world leadership amounted to a revolution in old ways of life, and still more old ways of thought.

"No country can expect to live forever at the fever heat of revolution: every Cromwell has his Charles II. But some at least of the revolutionaries live on, disturbing the new complacency by their mere example. Perhaps, indeed, the best reason for believing that the old America is still there is that so many people say that it is not." (*The Guardian* [Manchester], Jan. 23, 1960)

# CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

## THE Nth COUNTRY PROBLEM

The prospect of widely scattered nuclear weapons was called the "third country problem" before Britain had nuclear power. It was called the "fourth country problem" until France set off a plutonium explosion in the Algerian desert. With the likelihood of further nuclear spread, the safest designation is now the "Nth Country Problem."

Christian A. Herter

"The proliferating production of nuclear weapons might eventually enable almost any country, however irresponsible, to secure those weapons. We are not so concerned with regard to the free nations which might be the next to produce nuclear weapons. But we are concerned lest the spread becomes wholly unmanageable: The more nations that have the power to trigger off a nuclear war, the greater the chance that some nation might use this power in haste or blind folly." (Address before the National Press Club, Feb. 18, 1960)

*The implications of the problem and methods for dealing with it were considered by a committee of the NPA.*

National Planning  
Association

"It is a challenge which is not receiving the very serious attention it deserves at home or abroad. It is also an opportunity to find at least one common concern which might move the nuclear powers of both the East and of the West to achieve some limited agreements for joint action.

"Proliferation of nuclear weapons will inject incalculable factors into the equation of international politics. Some countries, under economic or other pressures, may eventually sell atomic weapons. Governments under fanatics or dictators may act rashly. The possibility of accidental or of unauthorized use of atomic weapons will increase. Irresponsible 'mischief-making' by one small nation could catalyze a nuclear conflict between larger powers, or might cause pre-existing nonnuclear hostilities to escalate into nuclear hostilities.

"The risk of accidental war by the mischievous action of a third party or by the possible mismanagement of tests, war exercises, strategic miscalculations, and the like is further enhanced by the rapid introduction of 'quick reaction' systems. These tend to be inflexible, so that full-scale war may grow out of inadvertencies or deliberate mischief. It will become even more difficult to achieve and enforce arms control agreements, and much harder to inspire confidence in their effectiveness.

Who can make  
nuclear weapons?

"The Nth country problem derives urgency from the fact that we are approaching the point where it will no longer be possible for the present nuclear powers to control the spread of nuclear weapons. Once a nation has successfully completed an atomic weapons program, it will have nuclear stockpiles which can be stored without appreciable deterioration, which can survive changes of government, and which can be sold, exchanged, or given away.

"The period, then, in which the major power blocks have a common opportunity to limit membership in the 'atomic club' is, in the long view of history, a very brief one. We are now living in that period, and ten years of it have gone by."

The assets that a candidate for membership in the nuclear club must possess are scientific manpower, general industrial capacity and capacity

**Findings and  
conclusions**

specifically in the fields of electric power, steel, chemicals, engineering and large-scale construction. Perhaps eleven countries are already equipped for a nuclear arms program which could yield results within about five years. These are: Belgium, Canada, West Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland and, beyond the Iron Curtain, Communist China, East Germany and Czechoslovakia.

Nations which would find the task more difficult but not insuperable are Australia, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland and Yugoslavia. A third group, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Norway, Spain and South Africa, is regarded as unlikely to be able to manage the job in five years.

"The committee concludes:

"1) That the dangers of the wide diffusion of nuclear weapons within the next 30 years are real. Such diffusion may very well vitiate the stability which could conceivably otherwise arise in an era of balanced nuclear forces. These dangers must be considered by both the United States and the Soviet Union in all their negotiations on arms control. Neither side wishes to take substantial risks, but both sides must consider the heavy risks involved in continued inaction.

"2) That the nuclear powers could curtail the dangers of perversion of economic aid programs for peaceful uses of nuclear power if they would make greater use of international agencies which impose stringent controls. . . .

"3) That direct control of the spread of independent military nuclear power is possible only in terms of larger disarmament arrangements. The promulgation and enforcement of an effective international accord to cease nuclear tests will tend to prevent the development of nuclear weapons by new countries. More comprehensive agreements—particularly those looking toward controls on production—will provide a more potent inspection system, which could enable control authority to detect evasions with certainty and accuracy." (*The Nth Country Problem and Arms Control, A Statement by the NPA Special Project Committee on Security through Arms Control and A Technical Report by William C. Davidson, Marvin I. Kalkstein, and Christoph Hohenemser, 1960*)

*A possible extension of the nuclear threat was emphasized by the British representative at the ten-nation disarmament conference.*

**David Ormsby-Gore**

"Today it is unquestionably possible to put very large weights which could embrace nuclear weapons into orbit. But it is not yet possible to bring them back to earth at a selected spot. Let us be thankful for that. But let us not assume it will be impossible for long. We should be very unwise to assume that the technical problems will not soon be mastered. We must insure that nuclear weapons are never put into orbit around the world by anyone." (*The New York Times*, Mar. 17, 1960)

*Professor Rostow of Massachusetts Institute of Technology suggests why the Soviet Union might be ready to accept controls.*

**W. W. Rostow**

"Why should Russia now join in an effective system of arms control? . . . The prospect for Russia is to see vast new nations which it cannot control come into the world arena—nations which, as the power to use atomic weapons spreads, could precipitate a disastrous war. The basic Russian national interest, with respect both to the new weapons and to the rise of new nations, is defensive, and similar to the Western interest. The old Eurasian struggle, based on the vulnerability of Eastern Europe and China,

is a thing of the past. The one rational choice for Russia is to join with the other nuclear powers in creating an arms-control system so solid and secure that, as China and the new nations of the South come to maturity, they enter an ordered world.

"Some perception of this already exists in Moscow. It lies behind the Soviet emphasis on ending nuclear tests, which would more or less freeze atomic capabilities. But it is not realistic to conceive of the other nations permitting a nuclear Big Four to block them out while the Cold War goes on in its old terms, merely without bomb tests. The one option that does lie within the present powers' grasp is to define the terms within which power will be diffused as other nations march to maturity. The diffusion can be made safer; it cannot be prevented.

"This means that the Soviet government would have to abandon its commitment to strive for world hegemony for communism. Already, as Tito and others have discovered, when Soviet Russia has had to choose between the spread of communism as an ideology and the effective exercise of power from Moscow, it has chosen the latter. It might, then, not be too difficult to reconcile a tacit Soviet acceptance of conventional national status in a world of powerful nation-states with the outward maintenance of the rhetoric of the old-time religion of world domination. A nation's rhetoric can persist—as familiar and comforting background music—long after it has lost its relation to reality.

"How can we persuade the Russians to face the fact of the diffusion of power, and to accept the age of high consumption? We must demonstrate:

"1. That we shall not let them get far enough ahead to make a temporary military resolution rational.

"2. That the underdeveloped nations—now the main focus of communist hopes—can move into take-off within the democratic orbit (this is the most important item on our agenda).

"3. That there is for Russia an interesting and lively alternative to either an arms race or total surrender, that is, a dignified and responsible role in the world as a major nation-state, among many." ("Economics for the Nuclear Age," *Harvard Business Review*, January-February 1960)

## ALSO NOTED

*The ever-present threat of accidental war impelled the editor of Parade to address an open letter to President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Premier Nikita Khrushchev.*

Jess Gorkin

"When you have your private talks in Moscow this June, I urge you to consider the establishment of a direct telephone line between you that will be open 24 hours a day, with standby interpreters.

"Its purpose: to prevent the possibility of an accidental war.

"If you, as world leaders, are never more than a few minutes away from each other by telephone, then I believe the risk of accidental war will be immeasurably reduced.

"Experts tell me that this system is not only technically feasible but inexpensive and could be established within a few days.

"Contact between you today, even on the most urgent matters, must wait on the cumbersome, slow-moving machinery of diplomacy, wholly unsuited to the lightning emergencies of the space age. . . .

"Must a world be lost for want of a telephone call?" ("Re: Accidental War," *Parade*, Mar. 20, 1960)

# RADIOACTIVE POLLUTION

## WASTES FROM PEACEFUL USES

Walter Schneir

Extent of the  
hazard

"Compared with all other industrial pollutants, radioactive waste is millions of times more toxic, undetectable by human senses, and absolutely ineradicable except by a process of natural decay that may take centuries.

"Clearly this is the most hazardous and treacherous material man has ever tried to deal with. The danger of accidents was dramatically illustrated last November 20 by a minor explosion at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in a room where highly radioactive wastes are processed to recover plutonium. The explosion destroyed about \$10,000 worth of equipment and scattered one-fiftieth of an ounce of plutonium over a few acres. For the following three months, cleanup crews tracked down the minute quantity of plutonium; they painted buildings, tarred roofs, replaced asphalt roadways, removed and resodded grass, and destroyed several trucks. Physicians examined 250 employees and found that nine had absorbed some plutonium internally. . . . Total cost to decontaminate a \$10,000 explosion: between \$250,000 and \$350,000. . . .

"[Another] case in point is the pollution of the Animas River in Colorado and New Mexico, where the water used by 30,000 people was found by the Public Health Service to contain radium far in excess of maximum permissible levels. For a proper assessment of the danger from the wastes, the Public Health Service sought to learn what other man-made radiation the people of the area were exposed to. By unhappy coincidence, the peas, cabbages, lettuce, and other vegetables grown in the area were also discovered to have extremely large amounts of strontium-90 from fallout.

"The radium in the Animas River comes from a uranium refinery run by the Vanadium Corporation of America. For more than ten years the company had been pouring wastes into the river without regulation. Colorado and New Mexico assumed that the AEC was supervising the process; the AEC insists that it had no regulatory authority over a score or more of uranium mills until 1957. If this is true, it does not, of course, explain why the AEC did not ask Congress for authority to protect a public wholly unaware that it was being dosed with radiation. . . .

"Some sources predict three hundred fission-powered ships by 1975, dumping over a million curies of waste into the sea each year. Nuclear submarines and icebreakers have great and obvious advantages, but is it worthwhile to build merchant and passenger ships with atomic reactors? If the *Andrea Doria* had been nuclear-powered, millions of curies of radioactivity would have been released in the sea close to Nantucket, and very likely all the passengers would have been killed. . . .

Latest recommendations

"Certainly, any careful weighing of the pros and cons of nuclear power will have to consider the very latest recommendations on 'Somatic Radiation Dose for the General Population,' just released by the National Committee on Radiation Protection and Measurements. Here are a few of the report's conclusions:

"... even the smallest dose is associated with some risk. Under these circumstances, the exposure of the population to any increase in radiation should not occur unless there is reason to expect some compensatory benefits.

"... we believe that the population permissible somatic dose from man-

made radiations, excluding medical and dental sources, should not be larger than that due to natural background radiation, without a careful examination of the reasons for, and the expected benefits to, society from a larger dose." ("The Atom's Poisonous Garbage," *The Reporter*, Mar. 17, 1960)

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## MILK AND STRONTIUM-90

### Consumer Reports

"Although the precise degree of hazard from strontium-90 is as yet unknown, it is CU's [Consumer Union] opinion that it is sufficiently serious to warrant the most conservative approach, which includes taking steps to reduce the dietary strontium-90 content as soon as possible.

"Conceivably, this could be done primarily by removing the strontium-90 from milk, which may be the only food susceptible to purification procedures. From time to time, announcements appear in newspapers of discoveries of methods to decontaminate milk, but apparently none has been developed to the point of commercial feasibility. A team comprised of scientists from the U. S. Department of Agriculture, the Public Health Service, and the AEC has been working on development of a feasible large-scale method for several months now.

"Another approach which may help reduce strontium-90 in milk to some extent involves adding uncontaminated calcium salts to the feed of cows; this also is being studied. In order to reduce our strontium-90 intake from other foods, it may be necessary to devise new diets to avoid high-strontium-90 foods, which usually are our best sources of calcium; we would then require uncontaminated calcium from mineral sources to make up the lack. Such a step also would require considerable research.

"Unfortunately, there are no immediately available alternatives to the drinking of ordinary milk and the eating of an ordinary diet. As CU said last March "... it would be as foolish to stop drinking milk as it would be to refuse an X-ray examination for a broken limb." ("Meanwhile, Drink Your Milk," *Consumer Reports*, February 1960)

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## LETHALITY OF SUPERBOMBS

### Ralph E. Lapp

Eighty per cent of the lethal fallout associated with the explosion of a thermonuclear weapon is deposited more or less in the vicinity of the explosion-point, and 20 per cent is "injected into the stratosphere and is distributed globally. . . . The major share of the [radiation] dose from local fallout is delivered the first day." Whether an individual survives depends on the adequacy of shelter, whether he is downwind or upwind from the blast, etc. By means of decontamination procedures contaminating radiation can be reduced tenfold. "The acute radiation hazard would vanish within a few months" and not involve years of shelter-living.

Nevertheless, "fallout . . . could envelop an entire nation in lethality. . . . In a nation such as the United States an attack with 10,000 megatons of high-yield fission weapons would kill approximately 80 per cent of the population (if unsheltered) within sixty days. A 20,000 megaton attack would kill 95 per cent. . . . Present stockpiles are more than adequate to spread radioactive lethality over an entire continental land mass." ("Nuclear War," *Fallout: A Study of Superbombs, Strontium-90, and Survival*, edited by John M. Fowler)

## SHIFTS BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN

### LIMITS OF RUSSIA'S RELAXATION

Lewis Coser

"Let us assume for the purpose of argument that the standard of living in the Soviet Union will continue to rise substantially in the next period, and that certain modes of restraint which were necessitated by the process of primitive accumulation will become obsolescent. What then are the limits of relaxation? Here I consider it axiomatic that the ruling bureaucracy will not voluntarily relinquish its monopoly on political power and on the legitimate use of the means of violence. I cannot believe that within the foreseeable future there will come any significant move to relax the hold which the total party has over the political life of the country. There can be no relaxation with regard to autonomous political action. But there might be a possibility, a chance, that though the political reins will be held as tightly as in the past, considerably more relaxed policies may be applied to intellectual and social life.

The intellectual  
as court fool

"There exist today a number of countries, especially in Latin America, where a small authoritarian elite tightly controls the political structure and where the citizens still have a considerable degree of intellectual and personal freedom. In such countries the citizen is free to criticize the government; the writer, the student, the professor is free to reject the assumptions of official policy provided, and this seems to me the crux of the matter, provided I say, that these intellectuals do not appeal to the underlying population; provided, in other words, that there is mass apathy about things political. Under such conditions the intellectual is likely to play the role of the court fool; he may say outrageous things, he may needle and annoy and criticize the men of power and yet he will be innocuous since his ideas will have no consequences.

"Social systems provide for specific institutions which serve to deflect hostile and aggressive sentiments away from vital targets. These safety valve institutions help to maintain the system by preventing otherwise probable conflict or by reducing its disruptive effect. It is conceivable that a certain amount of intellectual and personal freedom in Russia might serve just such safety valve functions. Yet it can serve them only if the chance of wider strata in the population picking up this criticism and turning it to their own uses is effectively minimized. In other words, apathy of the population is a *sine qua non* for the employment of such a political formula. Only if relaxation is unlikely to lead to the mobilization of political energies can it be successfully applied. . . .

Limited tolerance

"If Soviet man were to acquire the characteristics of Tocqueville's mass man, then it stands to reason that the political formula I have alluded to stands a considerable chance of successful implementation. In Latin America the apathy and passivity of the population is conditioned by illiteracy and primitivism; in an industrialized post-hump society mass culture may be the functional equivalent of illiteracy. We may witness in the future Russian society a considerable relaxation of controls over writers, scientists, university intellectuals. If the Soviet Union grants these men freedom to think and create; if we should note an end to the detailed regulation of personal opinions and private lives, then this should not lead us to believe that the Soviet Union has become a free and humane society. It is conceivable that *Dr. Zhivago* will be published in Russia, but not conceivable that

Djilas' *New Class* appear there. In other words, freedom could be granted only to those modes of expression which do not directly challenge the basis of Soviet rule. 'Theory becomes a physical force as it takes possession of the masses' (Marx)—and as long as it does not, it may be tolerated because it must finally remain innocuous." ("Thoughts on 'Prosperous' Communism," *Dissent*, Winter 1960)

*A former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union evaluates post-Stalinist trends.*

**George F. Kennan**

"Russia is a country of contradictions. The history of Soviet power is one long record of the confusion of ends and means. . . .

"There is a curious sort of duality today in the personality of the Soviet government. One sees that certain phases of Soviet life are controlled and shaped by persons who have quite a lot of confidence in the new Russia, and find unnecessary these devices of the Stalin age. But certain other forms of Soviet intellectual life . . . still seem to be, so far as the Party itself is concerned, under the influence of people of whom that cannot be said, and who cling to all the timidity and all the narrowness. . . .

"What we now see in the Soviet Union represents a compromise among these differing views. The liberalization has scarcely gone as far as some would have liked to see it go. Nevertheless, it has gone so far as to represent a highly significant departure from Stalinism and an essential alteration of the nature of the regime. Can it move back? Of course it can; there are no legal or constitutional barriers. But there is still a strong aversion in the older generation. And a younger generation is growing up which is habituated to a greater freedom and to greater expectation of personal comfort than they could have dreamed of some years ago. It would be extremely difficult, today, to turn the clock back. . . .

"On countless occasions when I have been asked which of two seemingly contradictory and incompatible realities is true in the Soviet Union, I have been obliged to say: both. The Stalinists are still there. They are people who, from habit, from fear, from limitation of vision, can think in no other terms than those of absolute domination. For them the Utopian end-product of socialism has become indistinguishable from a state of total political slavery. But these are only a portion of the leadership. They do not command the confidence of the oncoming generation. From the long-term—and short-time—standpoints they would appear to be on the side of the waning, not the waxing trends of Russian life. In the main, the goals and trends of Russian communism lie along the same path of those of Western liberal-industrialism." ("A Conversation with George Kennan," *Encounter*, March 1960)

*The Soviet affairs specialist of The New York Times compares Premier Khrushchev with his predecessor, Joseph Stalin.*

**Harry Schwartz**

"The most important difference [between the Khrushchev and Stalin periods] is that there is not in the Soviet Union now the terrible, stark atmosphere of terror imposed by the secret police that existed in Stalin's last years. Premier Khrushchev goes to great pains to mingle with the people in a manner reminiscent of an American politician seeking votes, something Stalin never did.

"Perhaps the matter is best summed up by the conclusion that Premier Khrushchev is the rational head of a bureaucratic dictatorship, while Stalin was the paranoid chief of a secret police system of total terror." (*The New York Times*, Mar. 20, 1960)

## KHRUSHCHEV'S GERMANY

Flora Lewis

"The outlines of a definite and concrete plan to bring all the strength of Germany to Communist power emerge clearly from conversations in the course of a tour of East Germany. It is apparently no secret, although the specific timetable is not laid down for the Western visitor and has to be pieced together. Here, as East German Communists see it, is the program:

"For the next three or four years, East Germany will continue to concentrate on speedy economic development. Consumer goods will not be neglected, for the political goal requires that the gap between living standards in East and West be practically eliminated. However, basic industrial expansion has also to be continued as the foundation of economic power.

"At the end of that period, the East German regime should have achieved firm control at home. Then will come a new and intense campaign directed to West Germans, based on the argument that 'we have each done pretty well by ourselves, but think how well off Germany would be if we work together.' If, as the Communists hope and expect, a recession develops in West Germany, the campaign would be timed and shaped to take advantage of it.

"The appeal will be strongly nationalistic, offering reunification not just as a sterile buffer state in the center of Europe but as a revival of dynamic nationhood, drawing strength from an alliance with Russia just as Bismarck did. . . .

"Regardless of Nikita Khrushchev's stinging cracks, the East German Communists are *not* counting on perpetuation of two Germanys nor do they believe that is really Soviet policy. The success they have already achieved inside East Germany has transformed the dream of taking over all Germany into a firm belief that victory is coming.

"The assessment has imposed certain tactical policies on the East German Communist leadership which they do not much like but accept as the necessary means to the goal. The essence of these tactics is to slow down the real communization of society wherever that is required; to foster illusions about the future; in short, temporary appeasement. The policy decision to raise living standards rapidly has been the central measure. Others include accepting what is a snail's pace, compared to the other Eastern European Communist states, on nationalization of shops, artisans, and small private industry. There are still private factories with as many as 200 to 300 workers in East Germany, unheard of in the other satellites. . . .

"The timetable is also predicated on the expectation that tensions between Moscow and Washington will diminish considerably, and with them, American strength and fortitude in West Germany.

" 'Wait three or four years,' East German Communists kept saying, 'in three or four years, the situation can be very different.' " (*Washington Post*, Mar. 23, 1960)

*In another article Flora Lewis concluded:*

Two facts stand out clearly from a recent tour of East Germany. The first is an acute sense of German national unity: The people living in the German Democratic Republic feel themselves an integral part of a German entity. "The second fact that stands out sharply is that the Communist regime in East Germany has solidified its foundations, gained confidence in itself and achieved the ability to provide for its people." ("Report from Khrushchev's Germany," *The New York Times Magazine*, Mar. 20, 1960)

Intimations of  
unification

# CHALLENGE OF COMMUNIST CHINA

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## MOTIVES FOR AGGRESSION

**Charles de Gaulle**

"No doubt Soviet Russia, in spite of having aided communism to take root in China, recognizes that nothing can change the fact that she is Russia, a white nation of Europe which has conquered part of Asia, and is, in sum, richly endowed with land, mines, factories, and wealth, face to face with the yellow masses of China, numberless and impoverished, indestructible and ambitious, building through trial and hardship a power which cannot be measured and casting her eyes about on the open spaces over which she must one day spread." (Nov. 11, 1959)

**Rockefeller  
Brothers Fund**

"What is clear is that Communist China is in a posture which in past historical experience has almost invariably led to aggression. It has a rapidly growing population, a shortage of vital resources, and a fanatical ideology. Around a large part of its perimeter exist 'soft' situations, making infiltration, subversion, and outright conquest seem easy or inviting prospects.

"Moreover, it looks upon the United States as its supreme enemy, the only major obstacle to its domination of the Asian continent." (*The Mid-Century Challenge to United States Foreign Policy*)

**A. Doak Barnett**

"If its internal political problems took a more serious turn, Peking might respond not by concentrating its efforts more upon domestic affairs but by seeking new gains abroad. Significantly, soon after the 'hundred flowers' period, with its outpouring of internal dissatisfaction, was abruptly ended in China, Peking de-emphasized its 'peaceful coexistence' policy and adopted a more militant posture in world affairs. Instead of responding to the evidence of increased problems at home by cutting back its risks and commitments abroad, the Chinese Communists displayed greater belligerency and recklessness than they had for several years. . . .

"If economic conditions in China deteriorated seriously or the pressure of population became intolerable, Peking's leaders might then be tempted to solve their domestic problems through expansion abroad. Although, conceivably, they might turn their attention to the underdeveloped and underpopulated areas of Soviet Asia, they would more probably be tempted into foreign adventures to the south, in the relatively underpopulated areas of Southeast Asia, with their rich natural resources and food surpluses." (*Communist China and Asia*)

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## GROWING PAINS

### POPULATION 1980: ONE BILLION

**Alan F.  
Gutmacher**

"China, the ever-growing threat, is increasing daily the mouths it has to feed, the bodies it must house, and the people for whom living room must soon be created. The rate of increase is a staggering 12 million lives a year. With a rising technology of modern medicine, public health and agronomy, the previous safety valves for population overgrowth—pestilence and famine—will no longer apply their traditional brakes on growth. As a result, the annual increment of people is increasing inexorably decade

by decade, so that in 1980 China's present 600 million population will have swollen to more than a billion—a fantastic, nightmare figure considered in all its implications." (*Babies by Choice or by Chance*)

**John Robbins**

China's enormous population growth does not necessarily add to her power, as these annual millions of new mouths tend to hold back her economic development. Indeed, if by means of ruthless measures not available to the governments of other Asian countries China can hold down her numbers, "by 1980 a China of 700 million, thoroughly industrialized, would pose more of a threat to all its neighbors than a China of one billion, suffering from the economic backwardness that this population growth implies." (*Too Many Asians*)

**A. Doak Barnett**

"It is not merely the overall size of China's population which poses serious problems for Peking; it is also the continued rapid rate of population growth, revealed by the census data. Detailed studies of selected areas in 1953 showed an average annual birth rate of 37 per thousand and a death rate of only 17 per thousand, resulting in a net annual increase of 2 per cent. Subsequently, Peking officially estimated the rate of annual increase to be 2.2 per cent, which meant that China's population was increasing during the period of the First Plan by about 13 million persons annually. Official data published by the Chinese Communists indicate that during 1952-1957 total population increased by over 11 per cent, or some 65 millions, from 569 million in mid-1952 to 634 millions in mid-1957. In other words, the increase over five years was greater than the total population of all but a few major nations!" (*Communist China and Asia*)

#### **PRODUCTION GOALS**

**The Economist**

"The Chinese Communists lowered their economic targets for 1959 in mid-August after an agonizing reappraisal by the party's central committee; last month the regime was able to celebrate the attainment of these norms, usually with a good deal to spare. It may be some time before the outside world is fully persuaded that Chairman Mao's statistics are no longer in the state that Mr. Khrushchev has said Mr. Malenkov's once were. All the same, Peking is claiming an impressive rate of growth. The figure for steel output, from which production by what are called 'simple, local methods' is now said to be excluded, has reached 13.35 million tons, an increase of 67 per cent over 1958. Pig iron (again excluding the products of the rural blast furnaces) is said to have risen by 115 per cent to 20.5 million tons, and coal by 29 per cent to 347.8 million tons. This means that China has already exceeded the targets set by the second five-year plan for 1962.

"The Peking *People's Daily* has gone out of its way to bestow praise on the communes for their part in raising farm production in a year of serious floods (which affected 30 per cent of the sowing acreage). The total agricultural output value went up by 16 per cent, but grain output rose by only half that amount. After their reorganization and consolidation, the communes are now judged to be 'on the road towards healthy development.' They are confirmed as the ideal means of bringing about the future transition from socialism to communism. With a pointed glance elsewhere, the *People's Daily* has felt able to predict that the 'great future' of the communes 'will be acknowledged by an even greater number of people.' The massive scale of the problems entailed in China's industrial advance is emphasized by the official calculation that the number of factory and office

workers has gone up by nearly 20 million in the past two years." ("China Back on Target," *The Economist*, Feb. 27, 1960)

### EXISTENCE IN COMMUNES

A. Doak Barnett

The first of the new communes was formed in China in April 1958. By the end of 1958 virtually all the collective farms in China, over 700,000 in all, had been merged into over 26,000 huge communes. Within a few months a radically new form of organization had been imposed upon China's rural population.

"The communes are tremendous organizations. Each one usually includes all the people in a *hsiang* or township, and the average membership is 5,000 families. They have generally been formed by merging all existing collectives within a single *hsiang*, and they have taken over the local government functions of the *hsiang*. Under each commune administration various commissions and departments have been established to handle every activity in the area—agriculture, commerce, finance, education, and military affairs. The membership of each commune is organized 'along military lines' into production brigades and teams for work in agriculture and industry, as well as for other functions." (*Communist China and Asia*)

Albert Ravenholt

"The day in a typical commune begins with drill at sunrise—the Communists are systematically toughening all of China's population, and city-dwellers as well as peasants are required to get out for morning calisthenics. After a quick breakfast, men and women march off in platoons to work in the fields, in a primitive 'factory' or on a construction. There they are under the constant supervision of a commune regimental commander or other cadres. Usually these commune officials are exempted from manual labor as a mark of status. Each platoon is urged to compete with the next platoon in 'labor emulation drives.' The winning platoon is entitled to carry a banner and may paint a 'sputnik' on its mess hall door. Sometimes there is also the promise of meat or a similar delicacy several times each month for the outstanding platoons.

"In the push of the 'leap forward' campaigns the cadres were mustering even the children to weed or to move earth. Now the Communists have ruled that only children over nine years of age are allowed to work to 'learn productive habits.' One-half of each day is supposed to be reserved for schooling, although there are complaints that some cadres reduce class time to two and three hours daily. Older people also are expected to contribute their labor; women may be assigned to sewing teams or charged with babysitting in a communal creche while the older men are out driving the birds away from the ripening grain fields. Throughout the past year and, a half the cadres have been so demanding that the Chinese peasant, accustomed though he is to strenuous labor, has begun to give in physically. Due partly to the inadequate diet, men and women on labor platoons are reported working themselves to exhaustion. The Party has now decreed that every person is entitled to at least eight hours daily for sleep and four hours for eating and (actually largely nonexistent) 'personal' life." ("The Chinese Communes: Big Risks for Big Gains," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1959)

Chang-tu Hu,  
et al.

"In economic terms a commune enables the authorities to organize available manpower with maximum mobility and flexibility, and theoretically at least, fully adaptable to the purposes of those who direct it. Workers can be employed at any place and on any job for an average of twelve working hours each day, or as long as the last man-hour yields, in the

opinion of the administrators, more than it costs. The only limitations are what is physically possible and politically safe. The unit cost of such labor can be ascertained fairly easily, inasmuch as the rigorous use of a ration system, which calls for a little more than one pound of food a day per person, supplemented by very nominal wages, enables the planners to think of real wages in terms of a determinable subsistence fund. Thus, the aggregate volume of consumption can be regulated far more accurately than before and the risk of inflation lessened.

"Apparently the commune movement and the development of many small-scale industries were largely responsible for the advances in 1958. The massive scale of operations dwarfed previous statistics and is impressive even considering China's great size. For instance, 73 million women in twenty-four provinces were reported to be working on water conservation projects at one time; 60 million persons were said to be engaged in the extraction and transportation of ores and in iron smelting; some 520,000 small local industrial plants were added in 1958 over and above 3 million industrial units organized by the collective farms (later communes) in the first half of the year alone. These units included large numbers of iron smelting furnaces, small blast furnaces, power stations, cement kilns, and coal pits." (*China: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture*)

**Sripati  
Chandrasekhar**

"This is the commune where human beings are reduced to the level of inmates in a zoo. But there is a difference. The animals in a zoo do not have to work hard, and what is more, they do not have to listen to the quasi-compulsory radio. The lack of peace and quiet in the countryside, where no one can return and reflect, and the lack of privacy and solitude are to me more terrifying than all the hells put together." (Introduction to "Letters from the Communes," *The New Leader*, June 15, 1959. Available through Readers Service)

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## **A NUCLEAR POWER?**

**A. Doak Barnett**

"By 1958 Chinese Communist leaders began to talk of their determination to get possession of nuclear weapons. Early in the year Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi stated that Communist China would eventually acquire them, without specifying when.

"After Khrushchev's visit to Peking in July and August 1958, reports circulated in Eastern Europe that the Soviet Union had agreed to supply Communist China with both atomic weapons and missiles. These rumors have not been definitely confirmed, but in the summer of 1959 Khrushchev reportedly claimed, in an interview with former New York Governor Averell Harriman, that Russia has shipped numerous rockets to China, and it was 'reliably reported,' according to *The New York Times* correspondent in Hong Kong, that Lin Piao, Peking's new Defense Minister, had obtained assistance from a Soviet military commission in working out a reorganization plan for China's forces which would involve changing existing units into pentomic divisions capable of using nuclear weapons." (*Communist China and Asia*)

**U.S. News and  
World Report**

"The Chinese Reds are more interested in the psychological impact of an A-bomb than in producing a usable military weapon. For that reason, the Hong Kong experts say the Chinese probably will not even wait to engineer a bomb. An explosive device set off in China and monitored

throughout the world would be just as effective as a dropped bomb in notifying the world that China had become a nuclear power." (Jan. 11, 1960)

#### **Military Review**

"The great military parades that are staged on important holidays of the Communist regime in Peking and other places do not hide the fact that the equipment of the troops is not yet of the most modern type. The Soviet Union is to be considered the principal provider of technical armament. This is particularly true as far as tanks, planes, and small firearms are concerned. With respect to atomic armament an agreement has existed for several years concerning support between the two countries. Within the framework of this and an additional accord, there probably are provisions that arrange for the exchange of technical data and for cooperation in the sphere of nuclear physics, but not for the delivery of nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union to Red China. The installation of nuclear launching sites in the border countries, such as Tibet, are handled and directed exclusively by Soviet military specialists. This probably is based on a special agreement between the two countries." (Translated and digested by *Military Review*, January 1960, from an article by Dr. N. von Ostrowska in *Wehrkunde* [Germany], May 1959)

#### **F. C. Jones**

"The Chinese Communist leaders may not be content to wait upon events. They are in a confident and belligerent mood. The First World War resulted in the victory of communism in Russia, the Second World War brought China under its sway. Mao recently said that if there were a third world war, it would result in so much more of the world going Communist that the 'imperialists' would collapse altogether.

"What would happen to China in a nuclear war? To that Mao replies that even if 300 million Chinese were killed in such a conflict, there would still be another 300 million left. So there is no need for China to fear such a war; she would, he thinks, still survive, even if others were destroyed. That is a dangerous belief, which might make him risk a war, if he were sure he could gain his ends by no other means." ("Challenge in China," *Behind the Headlines*, Vol. XIX, No. 3)

#### **Louisville Courier-Journal**

"Even if we and our allies made an [arms-control] agreement with Russia, couldn't China go right ahead and produce atomic weapons, for the use of Russia, or for her own use? And isn't the second possibility even more frightening, in view of the hot Communist nationalism that runs like fire across China? . . . There is no good reason to believe that China could not in a few years produce atomic weapons in her own plants, with or even without Soviet technical help. Yet China is entirely outside the negotiations for weapons control." (Louisville *Courier-Journal*, Jan. 1, 1960)

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### **CHINA VERSUS RUSSIA**

#### **Chester Bowles**

"China's growing intransigency must surely constitute a disturbing factor in the Kremlin's calculations. Peking's apparent determination to increase tensions runs counter to Moscow's new approach. Maintenance of the Sino-Soviet axis will remain critically important to both parties for the foreseeable future, but the specter of an adventurous and aggressively minded Chinese 'junior partner,' with more than three times the population of the USSR, must concern Soviet planners deeply." (*The New York Times Magazine*, Dec. 20, 1959)

**Guy Wint**

"The Chinese believe that it is right that they should occupy their former frontiers at their maximum extent. They believe that it is natural that most other Asian countries should at best be clients of China and should not pretend to equality with it. They believe that Russia, whose philosophy they have borrowed, must recognize China's equality. Over the long run their attitude towards Russia may harden. Before the Chinese revolution, Chinese scholars, quoting Bismarck's observation that all Great Powers had hereditary enemies, used often to say that the really mortal persevering enemy of China was not Japan or the sea marauders from Europe but the land power in the north, Russia, which had overrun so much of Asian territory which should rightfully be China's. One doubts if Mao Tse-tung has forgotten that the Soviet satellite Outer Mongolia was once part of China. If and when China feels that it no longer needs a Russian alliance, this instinctive belief may once more show itself." (*"China and Asia," The China Quarterly*, January-March 1960)

**Conlon Associates**

"Between 1949 and 1958, the USSR probably furnished Communist China with \$2.24 billion in loans, but the great bulk of this was in the form of military assistance. The amount clearly specified for economic development was only \$430 million. Soviet credit appears to have financed about 30 to 40 per cent of the machinery and equipment necessary for some 156 core projects. The latest economic agreement between Russia and Communist China, signed in February 1959, provides for supply to the extent of \$1.25 billion over eight years.

"Clearly, Soviet economic assistance up to date had represented only a small fraction of the total capital involved in the modernization campaign, probably about 3 per cent of the total net investment. And this aid has required Chinese repayment in exports, repayment which is now under way on an increasing scale. The Chinese industrial revolution is being paid for by the Chinese people; it is not a gift of the Soviet Union." (*United States Foreign Policy: Asia*, prepared for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Nov. 1, 1959)

**K. Alexandrov**

"Khrushchev's policy of peaceful coexistence is an attempt to take into consideration the situation which has come about in the world as a result of the development of capitalist society along non-Marxist lines. His policy is the only one which seems likely to ensure some success for Communism. Were he to abandon such a policy the Party First Secretary would also have to abandon the idea of world revolution, since there is no other path to it. Here, however, he is coming up against the resistance of the Chinese, who do not have the possibilities at Moscow's disposal. Khrushchev can afford to talk about a modest increase in the Soviet standard of living since he had definite possibilities of actually raising it. Peking [is] not in a position to make such promises. . . . The political lines of two states at different stages of development cannot easily be coordinated." (*Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR*, December 1959)

**C. L. Sulzberger**

"Obviously the key Communist alliance is not disintegrating, because neither partner can afford the break. But it is apparent Khrushchev intends to reduce the risk of Peking setting off a world war Russia doesn't want. For the first time he seems to be attaching to Mao a military leash at least remotely similar to that on which we keep our ally, Chiang Kai-shek. We have helped Chiang build a strong defensive army and will give him every aid if he is attacked. But we will not permit him to invade the mainland. In

reverse, this seems to be the relationship Khrushchev now seeks with Mao." (*The New York Times*, Nov. 21, 1959)

**Alexander Werth**

"Russians who have been in China invariably tell you the same two stories: (a) that birth-control propaganda is in full swing in China and (b) that, in any case, there are still boundless untapped resources in Western China; and that the 'demographic pressure' of China is no menace. . . .

"Even so, I find in the ordinary Russian a slight uneasiness about the Chinese; they were *too* conscientious. One Russian was telling me how a bus driver, outside Peking, stopped the bus until he had killed a fly; and how Chinese students in Moscow work eighteen hours a day to get through their exams with top marks—an 'unsociable and pretty fanatical lot.' One bunch of Chinese students went so far in their revolutionary conscientiousness as to declare that they did not want their 300-ruble monthly subsidy, as they could live on 200. 'We Russians wouldn't do such a crazy thing.'" ("Notes on Khrushchev's Russia," *The Nation*, Feb. 13, 1960)

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**WHAT SHOULD U.S. POLICY BE?**

**A. Doak Barnett**

"The basic criticisms of current American policy toward China can be stated fairly simply.

"First, and in the view of many critics most important, it does little to lessen military tensions in Asia and in some respects it tends to heighten them, diverting attention from the all-important task of building political and economic strength in the non-Communist nations of the area. Beyond this, it clearly involves certain undesirable and unnecessary risks of war.

"Second, it lacks the broad base of international support which is essential to build a strong position for successful long-term competition throughout Asia. Instead of providing a desirable framework for growing cooperation in meeting the Chinese Communist challenge, it has in fact created significant divisive strains between the United States and many other non-Communist nations, including some of its close allies.

"Third, it is based on positions which will probably be subject to steady erosion and on fictions which will be difficult to sustain in the years ahead. In all likelihood, therefore, it will prove untenable over the long run.

"Finally, it is inflexible, despite arguments to the contrary, and provides little room for adjustment, adaptation, and maneuver, all of which are essential if American policy is to cope successfully with opponents as agile as the Chinese Communists and with the demands of a rapidly changing situation throughout Asia."

*Dr. Barnett, whose book was sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, makes the following policy recommendations:*

**Recommendations**

"Increased efforts to open up certain channels of nonofficial contact with Communist China and the gradual relaxation of existing restrictions on trade, except on strategic goods.

"Effective action to persuade the Nationalists to evacuate the offshore islands and decisive moves to disassociate the United States from their defense.

"Efforts to induce some of the United States' major allies to commit themselves to the defense of Taiwan, as well as to persuade a larger number of nations that neutralization of the Taiwan Strait should be an international responsibility.

"Moves to redefine the United States' view of the status of the Republic of China on Taiwan, which would make it clear that, while recognizing the Nationalist regime's authority over Taiwan and the Pescadores and reemphasizing its pledge to defend these islands, the United States no longer recognizes the Nationalists' claim to be the government of the mainland of China.

"Action to indicate that the United States acknowledges the *de facto* control of the 'People's Republic of China' on the mainland, but that it specifically rejects Peking's claim to Taiwan. Either simultaneous with this action, or at an appropriate later time, the United States might indicate a willingness to consider formally recognizing the Peking regime, and establishing relations with it, if the Chinese Communists, accepting the fact that the United States intends to continue defending and supporting the Nationalists, were willing to reciprocate.

"An effort within the United Nations to link the seating of Peking with the simultaneous admission of Nationalist China as a new member, conditional upon Communist China purging itself of aggression in Korea by fulfilling certain clearly defined requirements, which should be determined by the United Nations. The United States should continue opposing the seating of Peking except on these terms, but at the same time it should be willing to accept the majority view, whatever it might be, on the question of China's seat in the United Nations." (*Communist China and Asia*)

#### Chester Bowles

"Americans and Nationalist Chinese alike should now strive to find a common ground with their allies and friends, and to relate their policies more rationally to the forces which will shape events in Asia during the next decade. Such policies, I believe, may be based on the following assumptions:

"1. That the Peking Government, although beset with difficulties, is in firm control of mainland China.

"2. That mainland China, with an inadequate resource base, spiraling population, ruthless Communist leadership and intense nationalist spirit, will develop fiercely expansionist tendencies directed toward the weaker neighboring states to the south.

"3. That a primary aim of American policy should be to prevent the armed expansion into Southeast Asia which Chinese Communist leaders may be tempted to undertake.

"4. That any effective disarmament program will ultimately require Peking's participation.

"5. That in the present circumstances no negotiation of our major differences with the Peking Government seems likely to be productive.

"6. That the 8 million Formosans and the 2 million mainland Chinese on Formosa have the right to a secure, independent existence and to cultural development outside the Communist orbit; and that such an evolution on Formosa is in the interests of the American people.

"7. That for the time being Formosa's independence will continue to depend on American military guarantees and economic assistance.

"8. That in the long run the security and prosperity of the people of Formosa will depend on the orderly political growth of the non-Communist nations of Asia, particularly India and Japan, and on their attitudes toward the Formosa Government.

"9. That if ever it becomes practicable it will be in our national interest to restore our traditionally friendly ties with the Chinese people on the mainland." ("The 'China Problem' Reconsidered," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1960)

## EMERGING AFRICA

### WHAT KIND OF DEMOCRACY?

*The man almost certain to become first African Prime Minister of Tanganyika discusses the argument that an African state cannot be democratic if it is governed by one party. This argument, he suggests, ignores three important factors.*

**Julius Nyerere**

"The first is this: that a country's struggle for freedom from foreign domination is a patriotic struggle. It leaves no room for differences. The issue, at that stage, is a simple one, and one which unites all elements in the country. As a result you find—not only in Africa but in other parts of the world which face a similar challenge—the growth, not of a 'political party,' but of a nationalist movement.

"It is this nationalist movement which fights for, and achieves, independence. It, therefore, inevitably forms the first government of the independent state. It would surely be ridiculous to expect that a country should voluntarily divide itself for the sake of conforming to a particular expression of 'democracy' which happens to be seen in terms of a government party and an opposition party; and to expect the country to do this in mid-stream and during a struggle which calls for the complete unity of all its people. . . . It appears natural that young nations which emerge as the result of a nationalist movement having united their people will be governed at first by a nationalist government as distinct from a party government. No one should therefore jump to the conclusion that this means such a country is not democratic or does not intend to be democratic. . . .

**Is an opposition  
necessary?**

"Another factor which is generally forgotten by these critics is that the presence of an organized opposition as a visible symbol of democracy is not, in fact, universal. It is, rather, the Anglo-Saxon's symbolic demonstration of his own democracy and implies the existence of a class struggle. In my opinion, the two basic essentials to democracy are freedom of the individual and insurance that the government of a country is freely chosen by the people.

"The third factor . . . is the history of Africa. In traditional African society, the African never was—nor thought himself to be—a cog in a machine. He was a free individual in his own society and his conception of government was personal, not institutional. When 'government' was mentioned, the African thought of the Chief. Unlike the Briton, he did not picture a grand building."

In primitive African society, conflict between the individual and the state was not very clearly defined. "The traditional African community was a small one, and the African could not think of himself apart from his community. He was an individual; he had his wife—or wives—and children, so he belonged to a family, but the family merged into a larger 'blood' family which, itself, merged again into the tribe. Thus he saw himself, all the time, as a member of a community. But he saw no struggle between his own interests and those of his community—for his community was, to him, an extension of his family. He might have seen a conflict between himself and another individual member of the same community, but, with the community itself, never. One must not think that the African is therefore a 'natural Communist.' He is not. To him, the wage is his wage; the

property is his property; but his brother's need is his brother's need—and he cannot ignore that need. He has not yet learned to ask: 'am I my brother's keeper?' The African is not 'communistic' in his thinking; he is, if I may coin the expression, 'communitary.' He is not a member of a 'commune'—some artificial unit of human beings—he is of a genuine community, or brotherhood." ("Will Democracy Work in Africa?" *Africa Special Report*, February 1960)

#### Stephen Enke

"There is no real 'nationalism' in Africa—only tribalism and now racialism. A word with some favorable associations is being applied to something else that many people would not approve under its real name.

"The concept of nationalism has a European origin. . . . Nationalism is usually based on a common language, culture, history and religion. It thrives when these are in contrast to those of some neighboring country. Thus the Italians came to feel like Italians because they sensed their differences from Austrians and French. And Italy is where Italians live.

"None of this applies to sub-Sahara Africa. The 'country' boundaries were determined arbitrarily in European capitals without reference to native tribes and cultures.

"Nigeria cannot be defined as where Nigerians live. In each 'country' there are numerous tribes often speaking different languages and having different loyalties.

"There are no native Northern Rhodesians—except perhaps legally—but Bemba, Rozi, Nsenga and many other tribes. Dr. Banda is not trying to 'free' Nyasaland so that its distinctive national ethos can emerge untrammelled, for there is no distinctive Nyasaland culture, and Dr. Banda on his arrival 'home' some years ago had to use an interpreter.

"After loyalty to the tribe, the next higher loyalty is not to Uganda, Ghana, or some other 'European' legalism, but to race. For this the white man is of course partly responsible. And it is by appealing to race that the younger and more violent African politician in the town must undermine the authority of the more conservative tribal chiefs. This is the way to personal power.

"Racialism is seldom pretty. Soon it will be so naked that even 'liberals' will see it." (Letter to *The New York Times*, Feb. 14, 1960)

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### WHAT KIND OF LEADERS?

*Hugh H. Smythe of Brooklyn College has made a study of the growing new African upper class that is leading the emergent continent toward independence. Mabel M. Smythe, lecturer at the City College of New York, conducted a study tour of Nigeria in 1958.*

#### Hugh H. and Mabel M. Smythe

"The power of the new African elite class is centered in political, not economic, authority; the latter is still controlled almost entirely by foreign, or at least non-indigenous, interests. The new political leaders, who are directly or indirectly Western-educated, have ideals and an outlook, as a whole, much more Western than were those of the prewar African upper-class elite, which had been composed mainly of persons who belonged to families of high status and prestige in the old African traditional structure. The contemporary elite consists largely of Africans concentrated in the expanding urban centers, since it is in the cities that one finds most of the upper-level functionaries in the local and national governments, as well as in such major social institutions as churches, civic and recreational agencies,

#### Africa's new upper class

labor organizations, and business enterprises. In addition, in the transitional social stage through which Africa is passing (and in the absence, as yet, of clear-cut boundaries between upper and lower social classes), the elite group also encompasses a number of other people whose extensive education and present occupations seem to have potential for future upward mobility. Thus, at a typical elite reception in a British West African city, one meets school principals and some teachers, perhaps a distinguished churchman, a judge, an influential indigenous ruler, a building contractor, a doctor, a nurse or two, a local politician, senior civil servants, a newspaper reporter, perhaps a university student or two, a few clerks, and others on their way up the socio-economic ladder. . . .

"At the apex of this urban-oriented social class are those who occupy high political offices—prime ministers, government cabinet members, and judges. Only a few of the holders of major traditional offices—the long venerated paramount chieftaincies—are here; and they are admitted to this new upper echelon largely because the politically-minded nationalist leaders respect the power indigenous rulers still command over significant numbers of the unlettered masses who vote. Here, too, are found the doctors and lawyers, whose supremacy is now being challenged by African holders of senior posts in the civil service formerly reserved for Europeans, and the bishops and outstanding clergymen. . . .

"As to Africa's significant problems of economic development and social welfare, the new elite as a whole have not yet marshaled their collective forces to deal with them. As among the new political states, there are a few signs within this new power group of a corporate consciousness, the Ghana-Guinea rapprochement being one example and the Mali Federation in French West Africa another. Within the separate states, however, many of the elite are still groping toward a sense of the power of collective action. In housing, for example, some of them are building their own houses, but most live (or look forward to living) in the comfortable Western-style homes, located in well-kept residential areas on the outskirts of Africa's booming cities and provided by the government for civil servants and their families. Working together as private citizens to develop a neighborhood is not yet common. . . .

#### Conservative nationalists

"As the new elite class stabilizes, it becomes more conservative, preoccupied with maintaining its own power. The zealous young men who, a dozen years ago in Ghana and Nigeria, made fiery speeches in favor of nationalism and independence are now middle-aged and established leaders with vested interests. They savor their newly acquired authority and eminence after long years of subordination to European colonial powers; responsibility makes them more cautious; they are human enough to guard their power jealously from encroachment by others, African or European, professions of democracy notwithstanding. . . .

"Moreover, these established leaders know there is a very real basis for fears of disunity in nations formed from colonies whose boundaries follow historical accident instead of surrounding united peoples with a history of cohesion. This is not to say that all members of the new power elite are likely to pattern their actions after the restrictive policies now being promulgated in Ghana by Prime Minister Nkrumah. But there is no question that they intend to maintain their hard-won seats of power and to countenance as little opposition as possible, especially so long as a sense of political insecurity keeps them aware that new nations are 'on trial.' The top-level politicians fear opposition because they are not confident that they can contain it; and the very success of independence, they believe,

hinges on their ability to demonstrate in the early days of their autonomy the ability to weld together the diverse tribal, clan, racial, and other groupings into a nation without false starts or temporary setbacks. The urgent necessity for sustained unity is perhaps the central concern of the power elite in each new African nation. This sense of urgency has communicated itself to members of the elite in general, and increasingly they feel the responsibility for resisting the influences which divide them. Unfortunately, recognizing a philosophical principle as 'good' and putting it into practice are not the same thing. It remains to be seen whether the elite can agree upon a basis for broad and comprehensive unity. Upon the depth and breadth of their areas of agreement will rest much of the effectiveness of the support which they must give to their rising leaders." ("Black Africa's New Power Elite," *South Atlantic Quarterly*, Winter 1960)

## AMERICAN POLICY

*In a book called The Death of Africa, Peter Ritner says that the continent can be saved only by heroic measures of which the United States alone is capable.*

**Peter Ritner**

"History has uncorked Africa, and has delivered her over to a deformed and diseased evolution which is working itself up to a climax of destruction. . . . What the world . . . is now witnessing in Africa is the birth of a historical monstrosity whose whole future is mortgaged to its deformities. . . .

"What we must do is to step into Africa and break, by main force, the mighty vicious circle of 'pauperization' and social disintegration, by planting in Africa—as surgeons plant tiny seeds of skin all over a badly burned chest—the mechanisms and installations that can then begin to run by themselves and weave into a sound social fabric. . . .

"Africa is a complex continent, and therefore we require for this task the services of something more like a college than a government agency—something that we perhaps can call the United States Institute of African Affairs, placed administratively under the Secretary of State. . . . This African Institute should be built in Washington or New York and should be able to depend upon a regular appropriation of \$5 billion to \$8 billion a year."

*In addition to carrying out a massive, continent-wide program of research, reclamation, development, construction and general education, the projected Institute of African Affairs would be the mechanism used to implement most of Ritner's political program as well.*

**A ten-point  
program**

1) In the newly independent states of West Africa the Institute should pump development funds into the area through existing institutions whenever possible.

2) In the Belgian Congo the U.S. should encourage Belgian-Congolese fraternal association and strengthen the existing administrative structure.

3) In Kenya the Institute should buy out the white settlers who want to leave.

4) Aid to the African nations should have two visible strings attached—absolute honesty in the use of our funds, and respect for the rights of minorities and political opponents.

5) The Institute should work closely with the British Commonwealth and French Community apparatus in Africa and the free states.

6) In the Central African Federation (Southern Rhodesia, Northern

Rhodesia and Nyasaland), Southern Rhodesia's whites must be dissuaded—by boycott of their goods and systematic discouragement of incoming American capital—from dominating Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The latter, probably returned to protectorate status under Britain, should be assisted by U.S. development funds.

7) All goods from Portugal and Portuguese Africa should be boycotted until a United Nations Study Commission is admitted into Portuguese Africa with full powers of access to all sections and records of the provinces.

8) "Southwest Africa should be invaded by a United Nations force, composed of contingents from African and Asian countries, and America; the Afrikaner government should be ejected and U.N. administration installed."

9) The U.S. should support Britain's determination to keep the High Commission territories (Bechuanaland, Swaziland, Basutoland) free of Afrikanerdom, and use the Institute to help make them showcases of free, modern Africa.

10) Nothing can save Afrikaner-dominated South Africa. "A Third Boer War—a United Nations invasion of South Africa, for example—is impractical if for no other reason than that it would involve the killing of so many innocent Africans. All we can do is isolate the country within her cordon of hate, and engineer the modernization of Africa all around her."

"Whether we do anything to stop the Death of Africa is a collective test of our seriousness and determination as a historical people, but for the sake of our private souls we cannot afford to fool ourselves about it. Things are not going to work themselves out for the best in Africa—*unless we make them.*" (*The Death of Africa*)

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## ECONOMIC PROSPECTS

A. J. Meyer

North African oil and natural gas fields are just being discovered and developed, but it is already certain that they are enormous. Within five or ten years Algeria and Libya may be producing two to three million barrels of oil per day, two-thirds of the current Middle East output. Their oil is cheap both to find and to produce. Its impact will also be felt in the United States, to whose refineries it is better suited than it is to those of Europe.

Oil earnings may have a fantastic effect on living standards in Algeria and Libya. The accelerated growth will strain their capacities to govern well and control social unrest, as well as make it increasingly difficult for France to consider anything other than an independent Algeria.

Increased availability of oil and especially gas will affect the European coal industry first and may force recalculation of timing for the advent of nuclear energy as a source of power. France, which currently spends 20 to 30 per cent of its foreign exchange on oil and coal, hopes to supply all its oil needs from the Sahara and export enough petroleum to achieve a favorable balance of payments by 1965. The important future role of European venture capital in North Africa cannot but have a political effect, as well as an influence on marketing and investment patterns in Europe.

To forecast the impact on the Middle East would be sheer speculation. But there will be severe loss of revenues both to producing nations and to Egypt's Suez Canal and Syria's and Lebanon's pipelines. Reconciling all the interests involved will require statesmanship of the highest order. ("North African Oil and the World Economy," *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, Mar. 1, 1960)

The impact of  
new oil sources

*Support for the idea of an Africa-wide economic development program comes from a Colgate University political scientist.*

**John Marcum**

"Should African governments confront the West with concrete suggestions for harmonized development and actually embark upon cooperative ventures among themselves, they would be in a position to bargain with the moral and material strength of a united voice and to command a more attentive audience among the Western powers. . . .

"They might attract economic and technical assistance from all comers, including the United States and conceivably some of the Communist countries, free from the dangers of neo-colonial economic pressures that can result from bilateral aid programs and an excessive reliance upon any one source of aid.

"At the non-governmental level, African political leaders might consider the creation of an African Movement. Pledged to promote the unification of Africa as the European Movement is to further the unification of Europe, an African Movement could help to popularize the cause of rational economic development on a continental scale and work to mitigate tribal and other internal rivalries. Might not the All African Peoples' Conference establish such a movement to plan and win support for the post-colonial construction of a united Africa? The latent enthusiasm for African unity within Africa's youthful, educated elite is a measure of the potential dynamism of such a movement. It would require relatively modest financial outlays, and just as the American Committee on United Europe has given material assistance to movements sponsoring European integration, it is reasonable to expect that the cause of African unity would find a response in the United States, especially among the 17 million Americans of African descent." ("Challenge for Africa," *New Leader*, Feb. 8, 1960. Available through Readers Service)

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## **AFRICA AS A BLOC**

**Allan A. Michie**

"During the last three sessions of the U.N. General Assembly it has become clear that there is a new element in international diplomacy. It is the emergence of a distinctly African voice. The member states—Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, and the United Arab Republic—shy from the word 'bloc,' but they constitute the most active and one of the most purposeful blocs now operating within the world organization. It has already changed the General Assembly's lineup.

"As the pace of the continent's emergence from colonial rule quickens, so the influence of the African group will grow. Furthermore, Africa is the only continent from which new U.N. member states are likely to be created. With independence promised and U.N. membership certain in 1960 for four new African states—Cameroon, Togoland, Nigeria, and Somalia—the Africans are sure of thirteen votes this year, and the independence conceded by de Gaulle to the Mali Federation (Senegal and the Sudanese Republic) and the Malagasy Republic (Madagascar) will lead to a parade of states of the French Community into the African battalion at the U.N. The bloc might muster thirty votes by 1962.

"Originally members of the Asian bloc (only three of the African states were members of the U.N. when that organization began), the Independent African States still vote on most occasions with the Asians as a bloc within a bloc, making the twenty-nine-nation combination the largest single pressure group within the U.N. Together, the Afro-Asians, if united, could

**The struggle  
for power in  
Africa**

muster a veto power in the Assembly, where two-thirds of the eighty-two-vote total is required for major decisions; and if they were to line up with the Soviet bloc (nine votes) and the Latin Americans (twenty votes), they could dominate the Assembly by commanding a more than two-thirds majority. . . .

"Although the Africans aim to be unanimous in their own bloc, they do not agree on all issues and a number of controversial intrabloc problems lie ahead. Two members of the bloc, Tunisia and the UAR, have severed diplomatic relations. . . . Liberia and Guinea are at loggerheads over the rich iron-ore deposits on their common border.

"Nkrumah and Touré, ostensibly united and pledged to join this year with Liberia in a Community of Independent African States, are jealous of each other's successes and are bent—each for reasons of his own—on breaking up the French Community and forming new alliances with the independent parts that emerge. Liberia, alarmed at the prospect that the coming struggle for power in Africa will be settled by military means, has prudently signed a military defense pact with the U.S. Meanwhile the emergence of Nigeria this year as an independent state, the largest and most populous on the continent, will transform the political balance of Africa and overshadow both Nkrumah's Ghana and his pretensions to leadership of black Africa. These power struggles may in time splinter the African bloc at the U.N., but for the present it is held together by a spirit of compromise and the experience almost all the member nations have shared: a hatred of European colonialism.

"The Asians at the U.N. were a heterogeneous group drawn together only by their opposition to colonialism; as freedom spread rapidly through most of Asia, the group lost much of its cohesion. No such immediate prospect confronts the African nations. Given the difficulties the British, French, and Belgians are experiencing in giving up colonial rule, the determination of the Spaniards and Portuguese to hold on to what they have, and the steady march of South Africa toward a race war, anti-colonialism may enable the African nations to plaster over their differences for some years to come." ("The Growth of an African Power Bloc," *The Reporter*, Mar. 17, 1960)

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**NOTES OF CAUTION**

*A Columbia Broadcasting System commentator suggests the kind of thing "Westerners of good will have often desired to say to the new Africans."*

**Eric Sevareid**

"A whole race cannot be condemned, not even the white race. Guilt is individual; you cannot hold me responsible for the slave trade conducted by my ancestors any more than I can hold you responsible for the slavery conducted by your ancestors long before the white man came to Africa.

"Most of you are getting your independence at the negotiating table; many Western countries had to fight for it, in most terrible wars. Self-pity is not among the noblest traits of man.

"Remember that democracy is the most difficult form of government that ever existed. Freedom from white rule will not guarantee that you as individuals will be free men. Already, in your parties and groups, you give signs of turning upon one another with most repressive measures. Many of you, especially the educated, suffer from what psychologists call the 'illusion

Walk before  
running

of the central position.' You think the future of mankind depends upon what happens in Africa. This is doubtful. Relax. You try my temper when we talk because yours is out of hand before you open your mouth. I am not the white race, the British or American government, or the United Nations. I am an individual, wishing you well. Stop addressing me as though I were an institution. If you would learn, do less lecturing and more listening.

"The good life for Americans or Britains was earned the hard way. They developed their countries by study, work, self-denial; but you sound as if you want the fruits before the tree takes root. You want a social-welfare state, complete with minimum wages, medical insurance, pensions, before you have created the capital to pay for it.

"Don't all of you try to be politicians or administrators in the civil service; they run countries but they don't build them. I admit that love of red tape is an acquired characteristic and you got it from your white overlords, but it isn't worth such passionate devotion. Having a junior clerk around to scold as your superior scolds you is not the highest goal of human endeavor. Don't grow out of your own tribal status symbols only to take over ours. Make room in your social pecking order for scientific farmers, civil and mechanical engineers, chemists, veterinarians. You need them badly.

"Secure your own country for democracy and stability before you try to rouse a whole continent in what you call Pan-Africanism. First, you're bound to go through the era of nationalism, like every other continent; don't expect to be exempt from the hostilities, aggressions, maybe even the wars that go with nationalism. Most of your people are still tribal-minded, not yet national-minded, and a long way from international-minded.

"I guess that one phrase would sum it all up: Begin at the beginning."  
("Talking Back to Africa," *The Reporter*, Feb. 4, 1960)

Historian Albert L. Guérard wrote an appeal "To My African Friends" shortly before his death, warning them of "four major delusions."

Albert L. Guérard

"The first of these is the continental fallacy: Asia for the Asians! Africa for the Africans! Europeans go home! *La valise ou le cercueil*—pack your grip or fill your coffin.' This seems so crude as to be hardly worth discussing. Yet, as a slogan, continentalism has a baleful power, even over minds that are not primitive. The tyranny of words, empty or weighted, is the first that we must guard against. And continents are mere words, conventional historical terms. . . .

"The second heresy is nationalism. It was not you who evolved the idea; you may have borrowed it from nineteenth-century Europe. You do not realize—many of us do not realize—that the sacrilegious principle 'My country right or wrong!' is recent and that its strength is waning, even though its manifestations are more lurid than ever. . . .

"The third idol is that of distinct, autonomous, consistent, organic cultures. This conception blends confusedly with the national. Ideally, it would seem that every culture group has the right—we might almost say, the duty—to form a separate political state. Conversely, historical states attempt, in the teeth of evidence, to create cultural unity within their frontiers. . . .

"The fourth and most insidious fallacy is that of race. Here we find confusion worse confounded. Both you, my African friends, and your supporters in America are at the same time on both sides of the fence, and neither you nor they seem to realize the absurdity of that position. . . ."  
("To My African Friends," *The Atlantic Monthly*, February 1960)

# REVOLUTIONARY NATIONALISM

## STATE OF CASTRO'S CUBA

Current summarizes findings of twelve journalistic investigations of one year of Fidel Castro's rule in Cuba.

Sources: Joseph Alsop, Mar. 11, 14, 1960; Carleton Beals, *Christian Century*, Mar. 9, 1960; Carl Brumley, *Wall Street Journal*, Jan. 18, 1960; Bertram B. Johansson, *Christian Science Monitor*, Mar. 16, Apr. 1, 4, 1960; Murray Kempton, *New York Post*, Feb. 15-21, 1960; Alan Levy, *Louisville Courier-Journal*, Jan. 1-7, 1960; Harold H. Martin, *Saturday Evening Post*, Mar. 26, 1960; Joseph Martin and Phil Santora, *New York Daily News*, Mar. 6-12, 1960; Harry B. Murkland, *Current History*, March 1960; Robert Taber, *The Nation*, Jan. 23, 1960; U. S. News & World Report, Dec. 21, 1959, Feb. 8, 1960; Ed Cony, *Wall Street Journal*, Apr. 6, 1960.

### Consensus

Most agree that Castro has the overwhelming support of the Cuban people—estimates range from 70 to over 95 per cent. All agree that U. S. investments are threatened by Castro's policies; that the country is in a difficult economic position, though they differ as to the cause and extent of the difficulties. None of them has anything good to say about the Batista regime.

All agree that some anti-U. S. agitation is an integral feature of the Cuban revolution; only Martin-Santora and *U. S. News* consider the regime Communist. Beals says Communists "actually have less influence in Cuba today than when Dictator Machado was overthrown by Batista and Grau San Martín; and probably less influence than under Batista, who publicly outlawed and secretly coddled them." Alsop suggests "that the right way to understand Castro and Company is not to search for Soviet agents, but to remember Gamal Abdel Nasser and his junta of young Egyptian officers." Kempton also notes that the only world figure praised by some Castro associates is Nasser. The *Monitor* quotes testimony of Gen. C. P. Cabell, Deputy Director of U. S. Central Intelligence Agency, that "Cuban Communists do not consider [Castro] . . . even pro-Communist. On the other hand, they are delighted with the nature of his government, which has allowed the Communists opportunity, free opportunity, to organize, to propagandize and to infiltrate. . . . The Communist viewpoint is that he represents leadership of a nationalistic, bourgeois-democratic revolution which precedes a Communist rise to power." Murkland says Castro's policies of expropriation and antagonism to U. S. are "exactly what the Reds want done" but does not think "Communists will ever openly and boldly take over the Cuban government." He regards the Castro movement as "the first social revolution since 1910" in Latin America, and believes it is setting a pattern that will be followed elsewhere in the area. If Washington learns "to encourage social reform . . . and to live with occasionally irritating nationalisms . . . the Communists can be fended off and with luck the hasty improvisations of a Castro can be avoided." The *Monitor* finds growing Communist influence, especially in the labor movement, along with a stronger counterattack which is hampered by Castro's anti-anti-Communist policy.

### How much Communist influence?

Beals, Kempton and Martin emphasize the honesty of the people around

**The state of  
the economy**

Castro, in contrast to the corruption of previous regimes, and the importance of this in maintaining Castro's popular support. Brumley says gold and dollar reserves fell to \$32 million at end of 1959 from \$120 million in September; Beals says the Castro regime "increased the monetary reserves—depleted by hundreds of millions in the final six months of Batista's rule through theft and military outlays spent to put down the Castro revolt to \$135 million, or about four-fold. . . . At present the balance has dropped to \$70 million. This is a normal decrease prior to a new sugar harvest, but it is still double what Batista left behind." *U. S. News* puts December reserves at \$60 million. Taber estimates those left by Batista at only \$110,000. The *Wall Street Journal* puts April reserves at \$65 million, with a debit of \$100 million in unpaid bills.

Martin emphasizes that many of the irregularities in land reform procedures, such as the failure to give receipts and make provision for payment as provided by law, can be attributed to the informality and impatience which Castro and many of his followers have toward paperwork; Martin-Santora and *U. S. News* regard such irregularities as signs of Communist influence. Brumley says refusal of bank loans and exchange for imports to U. S.-owned corporations is designed to force them to replenish Cuba's exchange resources by borrowing in New York; *U. S. News* sees a deliberate Communist effort to bankrupt the economy in order to prepare the way for communism. The *Wall Street Journal* thinks the picture for American business interests is gloomy, but that some U. S. firms may be saved by Cuba's economic dependence on them.

**How much  
personal freedom?**

All except *U. S. News* and Martin-Santora regard land reform—though not necessarily on the pattern followed—as necessary. Beals, Martin, Taber and Levy regard the land reform as on the whole successful; Kempton thinks it is achieving only a small part of what is being attempted—but that even this is much better than anything the Cuban peasants have had before. Martin-Santora charge that tyranny, torture and executions are worse than Batista's; *U. S. News* sees "fear and suspicion" everywhere; Kempton thinks there are more prisoners than under Batista, but they are well treated and usually held only briefly, and finds unease rather than fear among even the regime's opponents; Levy finds no fear, but a happy and united people. Kempton and Martin note with disquiet the encouragement of spying, the drilling of children and the political selection of teachers, but praise the extension of education and social services. The *Monitor* finds it highly likely that Castro will have to make some policy changes to meet growing internal dissatisfaction with high taxes, authoritarian measures, and Communist influence, along with sharper criticism from the U. S. and Latin America.

U. S. measures against Castro are suggested, though not specifically advocated, by *U. S. News*, and seem implied by Martin-Santora; opposition to them is implied by most others. The most specific position is that of Alsop, who favors sending the marines if Castro actually makes Cuba a Communist base, but opposes any reprisals short of that.

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**ALSO NOTED**

Widespread distortion in U.S. press reports about Cuba was charged in a *New York Times* advertisement signed by thirty persons, including Waldo Frank, Carleton Beals, Simone de Beauvoir, Truman Capote, Donald Harrington, Norman Mailer, Jean-Paul Sartre and Kenneth Tynan. (Apr. 6, 1960)

# MAKING ECONOMIC AID EFFECTIVE

## REVISING THE BASE OF HELP

The mechanics and objectives of helping less developed nations have been undergoing study in Washington, in Western Europe and at the United Nations.

*The Secretary-General of the United Nations speaks for his own constituency.*

**Dag Hammarskjöld**

"In underdeveloped countries I have many times heard the hope expressed that as much as possible of the international aid needed should be channeled through the United Nations. The reasons for this attitude of leaders in the countries concerned are easy to understand. In the first place, the United Nations has had special responsibilities toward all the non-self-governing territories. . . . This is the so-to-speak historical reason; the other reason lies in the relation of the United Nations to these countries' national independence. It is understandable that assistance, whether financial or technical, may be easier for them to accept when extended through, or in association with, an international body of which they are full and equal members. The mere existence of a small amount of international aid under the United Nations, utilized on the right level and on the right points, may make it a lot easier for them to seek continuing aid under bilateral programs." (Address, Mar. 8, 1960)

*A former Marshall Plan administrator and present Director of the U.N.'s Special Fund (which finances pre-investment surveys of underdeveloped nations) proposes a massive, long-range plan for increasing production in 100 underdeveloped countries.*

**Paul G. Hoffman**

The U.S. and the world should recognize the 100 underdeveloped nations as "a great new economic frontier." The goal: to raise the per capita income of the 1,250,000,000 inhabitants of the 100 countries from the present \$100 per year to \$125 in 1970.

"I propose that the nations of the world set for themselves the common task of assisting the people of the underdeveloped areas to increase the annual growth of their per capita income from 1 to 2 per cent each year for the next ten years. This means roughly an increase of \$2 per head per year, instead of the present rate of \$1 per head."

To achieve this the industrialized "have" nations will have to supply the underdeveloped countries with about \$7 billion a year—some \$3 billion more than the average of the past decade—for the next ten years. (*One Hundred Countries, One and One Quarter Billion People*, Albert D. and Mary Lasker Foundation)

*The Director of the International Cooperation Administration explains a new American aid policy of concentrating economic development help in countries "ready and willing for dynamic growth"—such as Taiwan, India and Pakistan.*

**James W. Riddleberger**

"Why are we suggesting an increased concentration of development assistance for economic growth in Taiwan and South Asia but not in other countries?"

First, a nation's development "must mainly be the result of its own

efforts." This means, among other things, taking "difficult economic, social and political decisions."

Second, "there must be an institutional and human resources base upon which rapid growth can be built." In practice, this means resources ranging from a working banking system to a labor force with some technical skills. Many nations do not have these prerequisites to development.

Third, there is the prospect that these nations may grow rapidly enough to begin to provide help to others less developed. Examples are India's help to Nepal and the technical assistance of Taiwan and the Philippines to South Vietnam.

"I believe one significant result of the assistance described above will be that free peoples everywhere will prefer to continue free, if through freedom, economic progress to the stage of self-sustaining growth is a discernible and realizable objective. . . . I do not mean to imply that those governments, whose countries are not yet in a position to qualify for intensive development assistance, should be cut off from assistance required by their special circumstances. They may also require assistance to help establish the institutional and human resource base capable of accelerated economic growth." (Testimony before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Mar. 23, 1960)

*The President of the World Bank warns of pitfalls.*

**Eugene R. Black**

"There is reason to call this the Age of Economic Development. But in these lands that we call 'underdeveloped' the impact of economic growth so far has done as much to destroy old habits and attitudes towards life and work as it has to create the new attitudes necessary for a better material life. Economic development in these lands has proved peculiarly fickle; even now it is creating human desires much faster than it is providing means for their gratification. . . .

"In Western societies the primary agents of change in the early stages of development were the entrepreneurs; governments could then confine themselves to ruling—to maintaining law and order. Now governments in the underdeveloped world are taking most of the development initiatives themselves, either because there is no entrepreneurial class of any significance or because only the government can raise the necessary capital. They have to lead as well as rule. To help these governments perform their necessary development functions without generating extravagant forms of political injustice and cruelty is really the major objective of economic aid. Orderly development procedures can help to bring about a realistic division of functions within government and between government and the private sector. Often the argument is most heated where there have been some tragically wasteful experiences with development, and where as a result order has given way to rationalization and self-justification.

**Orderly development  
versus ostentation**

"There is no more certain cause of frustration than the power plant, standing like the statue of Ozymandias in the desert, with no transmission lines connecting it with reality because the money ran out. Or the industrial plant without a market or even the prospect of a market, because nobody looked for a market before building it. Or the brand new turbine rusting on the dockside because somebody decided to buy it before deciding what to do with it. Or the newly irrigated lands laying fallow for lack of anybody to cultivate them. Such situations exist, and they suggest to me that economic facts can be very welcome and hopeful persuaders if they are presented in the right way and with a generous hand and heart." (Address, Mar. 3, 1960)

## THE PERILS OF BEING MISUNDERSTOOD

**Hamilton Fish  
Armstrong**

"Much has been said and written about the merits of long-range versus short-term aid projects. The former are called 'fundamental' and are assumed to be the more proper American way of doing things; the latter are called 'eye-catchers' or 'impact projects' and are often considered superficial, undignified and unworthy of our lofty aims. When the Russians present a complete hospital or a steel mill or pave a street it is criticized as an 'eye-catcher,' a sort of bribe, and it is compared unfavorably to our presumably more beneficial undertakings. Many long-range projects are highly important and useful, or will be if the local economy develops as expected and if there is political stability; and they are justified as contributing toward those results. Nevertheless, the magnitude of a project may raise the question whether the country concerned can develop the capacity to run, use and support it, and the time span involved makes one wonder what the conditions in the area will be when it is completed and who will be the ultimate beneficiary.

"A case in point is the scheme for irrigating the Helmand Valley, a vast desert area in southern Afghanistan, undertaken by an American engineering company at the Afghan Government's own urgent request and with U. S. Export-Import Bank assistance. The non-engineering problems were not sufficiently taken into account; in recent years the carrying costs have been eating up about a third of the Afghan Government's total annual income; and the project is still not completed. The expenditure of such staggeringly large sums on a single enterprise has multiplied Afghanistan's need for other foreign assistance, specifically for the loans that, as already noted, may result in mortgaging the country to Moscow. Now one such case history does not prove that we should not undertake projects to improve the economy of underdeveloped countries at the base. It does emphasize that although all projects contain unforeseen pitfalls, those that will take many years to complete and require very large and continuing contributions from the local government are particularly risky." ("Thoughts Along the China Border," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1960)

**Max Lerner  
from India**

During his visit to India Khrushchev's message "was that the West with all its economic power never gave India aid until it grew frightened of communism, and that the aid now given under spur of this fear is only a new form of colonialism. Even now, he continued, America hands out wheat and tinned meat to keep the Asians on a dole while Russia gives them factories to make them economically independent.

"One keeps getting reassurances from Indian friends that the Indian people are not so gullible as to be deceived by this. Perhaps not. Yet Americans here, in the euphoria of their self-congratulation because Khrushchev has had less success than he hoped and they feared, may easily ignore how clever this new propaganda line is.

"You have to remember how an idea which may be valid among top government people in India can get simplified and distorted by the time it becomes a propaganda slogan. The Russians have an initial advantage because they foresaw that Indian planning would inevitably put its stress on steel and heavy industry, and they have put all their eggs in that basket.

"True, the Western visiting economists have backed up the Indian resolve to hasten their 'takeoff'—the phase at which the developing economy can generate its own forward movement.

**The Communist  
tactic**

"Yet I have to report sadly that even high Indian circles tend to equate the heavy industry emphasis with the thinking of 'socialist countries.' One official told me how impressed he was with the capacity of high Soviet visitors like Kozlov to discuss the technical aspects of heavy industry planning. I never heard any Indian say this about any member of President Eisenhower's entourage, for the adequate reason that Eisenhower had no one like Koslov along. Yet the fact remains that while America is furnishing the most massive aid to India, it is the Russians who harvest the dividend of intellectual prestige. Several times recently I have had a question put to me somewhat as follows: We are grateful for the generous American aid in food and consumer goods, but do Americans fail to build steel plants here because they fear that India will develop its heavy industry and become economically independent?"

"I am certain that such questions are put sincerely. Yet behind the innocents who ask them you will find an active Communist who has set this train of thinking in motion.

"It is intended to offset the sheer factual weight of American aid to India and the undoubted current American popularity in India. The fact is that aside from food and grain shipments Americans have quietly helped rescue India from a serious crisis of foreign exchange and at the request of the Indian government they have made heavy balance-of-payments aid available to it. But this is not very dramatic nor have either the Indians or the Americans known how to dramatize it. In the battle for propaganda advantage the Russians are using the Bhilai steel plant to the hilt, and the point is that all the talk in planning circles and in Nehru's speeches about the need for heavy industry unwittingly plays into their hands. With all the virtuous intentions in the world the American failure to concentrate on more of what is called 'impact projects' is bound to give the Russians an advantage in the cut-throat propaganda struggle they are waging here.

"There is talk of a fourth steel plant being built for India, largely with American capital. If this happens the Russian propaganda line will again be clear—that out of fear of communism the Americans have sought to hide their colonialism by imitating the forms of Russian aid." (*New York Post*, Feb. 19, 1960)

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**WHAT KIND OF MEN CAN HELP?**

**C. P. Snow**

To help the scientific revolution in the poor countries we will have to provide "trained scientists and engineers adaptable enough to devote themselves to a foreign country's industrialization for at least ten years out of their lives. Here, unless and until the Americans and we educate ourselves both sensibly and imaginatively, the Russians have a clear edge. This is where their educational policy has already paid big dividends. They have such men to spare if they are needed. We just haven't, and the Americans aren't much better off. Imagine, for example, that the U.S. government and ours had agreed to help the Indians to carry out a major industrialization, similar in scale to the Chinese. Imagine that the capital could be found. It would then require something like ten thousand to twenty thousand engineers from the U.S. and here to help get the thing going. At present, we couldn't find them.

"These men, whom we don't yet possess, need to be trained not only in scientific but in human terms. They could not do their job if they did not shrug off every trace of paternalism. Plenty of Europeans, from St. Francis

Xavier to Schweitzer, have devoted their lives to Asians and Africans, nobly but paternally. These are not the Europeans whom Asians and Africans are going to welcome now. They want men who will muck in as colleagues, who will pass on what they know, do an honest technical job, and get out. Fortunately, this is an attitude which comes easily to scientists. They are freer than most people from racial feeling; their own culture is in its human relations a democratic one." (*The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution*)

**Hugh Tinker**

"The first axiom of aid programs should be that expertise is not automatically and universally applicable. The expert in farming, public administration, or labor relations is an expert on his own society alone. When he goes overseas he needs to reassess almost all his assumptions and many of his methods in the light of the culture into which he is entering. At least one university is considering creating a post in 'Asian Economics' and this is no Gilbertian idea; one must be versed in Indian public administration or Japanese labor relations before truly meriting the title of 'expert' in those lands. Of course this condition must be modified in keeping with how far the expertise is within the field of pure or applied studies. The knowledge of the mathematician is universal. An American cancer specialist will have a great deal to teach Indian doctors (although he may discover that Indian diet affects the incidence of cancer in the subcontinent). A European architect will have to learn a great deal about Asian materials, building regulations, labor, living habits, etc. before he can use his skill in the new land. And in practice, expertise is usually called for in the applied field." ("The Human Factor in Foreign Aid," *Pacific Affairs*, September 1959)

*Legislation providing for a study of the practicability of a "Point Four Youth Corps" has been introduced in the current session of Congress by the late Senator Richard Neuberger (D. Ore.) and Representative Henry S. Reuss (D. Wis.). Members of the corps would serve in technical assistance projects in underdeveloped countries, possibly as an alternative to the draft. A study of the proposal's possibilities was prepared by Arthur H. Darken of the Library of Congress, Legislative Reference Service.*

**Arthur H. Darken**

Initial legislation might authorize a corps of 10,000, serving for two-year terms at pay comparable to military scales.

The great need of the less-developed countries is for people to demonstrate agricultural, mechanical and scientific techniques, to teach English, and to help train native teachers in such subjects as biology, sanitation, mechanics, arithmetic.

Corps preparation should include some discussion of the highlights of American history, race relations, foreign policy and contemporary thought. "The spirit in which the Youth Corps projects are conducted is of the utmost importance." There must be "a genuine desire to work with the local people for a common purpose. Mature and sensitive young adults often do this effectively because they are enthusiastic and optimistic about what can be done to build a better future."

**Henry S. Reuss**

"The establishment of a Point Four Youth Corps would assure an adequate supply of young Americans to man public and private technical assistance missions." But even more important, young Americans in their late teens and early twenties need a sense of purpose—the excitement and stimulus of taking part in real events. If the evolution of the have-not

nations is at once the greatest challenge and adventure of the age, young Americans are going to want to become involved in it." (*Congressional Record*, Jan. 14, 1960)

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## IS ATOMIC ENERGY THE ANSWER?

*An engineer doubts that atomic power for underdeveloped countries is possible in the near future.*

**Michael J. Deutch**

"The hard realism of the moment is that a new source of energy has suddenly become available, but at too high a cost, and science has to struggle more with the technology before it can be efficiently harnessed. The means for delivering atomic energy to a point of ready use, at a price comparable with present power sources serving each locality, are just not available. Atomic power plants can well be built in places where there is no other power source available, but at a very high price. Long-range development of atomic power faces major technological hurdles which may take some years in resolving, but fortunately no theoretical considerations cast serious doubt that there will be a successful outcome. The short range is beclouded by the unhappy circumstance that more than fifty large-scale power projects based upon uranium fission either in operation, or being constructed, or in advanced design stages in various countries, are faced with considerably higher costs than originally scheduled. . . .

"It is to be feared that UNESCO and the International Atomic Energy Agency will continue to discuss the broader administrative problems inherent to the international agency, and the complicated legal and political issues involved in the problems related to disarmament, rather than undertaking direct technical assistance in the field of nuclear energy planning and integration. There is little doubt that the managerial talent or the peculiar training necessary for sound economic planning of energy systems does not exist at all in the underdeveloped areas (except Japan), and that this lack of know-how is unlikely to be remedied by lecturing in the 'reactor schools.'

"Any tangible accomplishment in this particular field requires (a) a steady flow of technical assistance in power planning, from our professional 'grass roots' to the governments of underdeveloped areas . . . and (b) vast financial grants—on a scale as yet not realized in Washington, and maybe even larger than the donor nations can budget in the foreseeable future. We cannot postpone for years the implementation of the much-heralded 'atomic power for peace and prosperity.'" ("Can We Afford Atomic Power for Underdeveloped Countries?" *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, January 1960)

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## ALSO NOTED

**Financial Times**

The Soviet economic challenge has become a frequent catchphrase in Western political and intellectual circles. Does such a challenge really exist?

"The existence of the uncommitted, undeveloped countries does not fundamentally change this picture. The proportion of the national income going to foreign aid is so small, in both America and Russia, that aid could be stepped up almost irrespective of the domestic growth rate. The whole aid effort of the Communist bloc is, on a generous estimate, equivalent only to that of Britain alone." (*Financial Times*, Mar. 21, 1960)

# THE INVASION OF SPACE

## COOPERATION AMONG ASTRONAUTS

Carl Dreher

"At the moment, all the indications are that the best we can hope for in the space race is a draw. It would seem only prudent, therefore, to consider the alternatives. We must not neglect any opportunity to come to terms with the Soviet Union in disarmament negotiations. The only crash program that makes sense is one in the direction of disarmament. One promising avenue of approach would be to try to establish a collaborative relationship between East and West in space exploration and research. The offer of Dr. T. Keith Glennan, head of NASA, to make the United States tracking network available to the Soviet Union for its manned space-flight program—if and when it has one—is a sensible step. The spatial environment is excruciatingly difficult, dangerous and expensive to get into, and even worse to get out of. As to living in it, we have no solid information at all as yet. The astronauts who make the first attempts, whatever their nationality, surely deserve the support of a concerted international effort. . . . A cooperative effort would give the astronauts a better chance for their lives and have a salutary effect in both camps. The difficulties are great, but the stakes are worth striving for. . . .

The race into space

"If the pressure to blast off into space were relieved, it would be no calamity for the human race, and even the aerospace people might be happier in the long run. Realistically, what does space offer? Adventure, a new form of sport: exciting, but warranting only a limited budget.

"Scientific information: likewise of great interest, but we don't have to get it all by 1970. Possibly new raw materials on the moon or Mars, but exploitable only at inordinate expense: no bank would lend a plugged nickel on that prospect. The military potential, as we have seen, is small. The private profits are immoral and demoralizing, and sooner or later will bring on another 'merchants of death' revulsion. If any residual capacity for sanity exists among us, now is the time to draw on it." ("Should We Continue the Race to Outer Space?" *The Nation*, Feb. 13, 1960)

## COOPERATION WITH EXTRATERRESTRIALS?

Newsweek

A systematic search for other life in the universe is now under way at the National Radio Astronomy Observatory in West Virginia. The astronomers in charge plan to focus giant receivers on those stars nearest the solar system which their calculations indicated have a fair chance of being supplied with planets. The hope is to detect signs of life intelligent enough to be sending out signals that we can intercept and recognize.

"There are sober-minded scientists who have had second thoughts about answering even if they get a signal. Cal Tech's Albert Hibbs, for one, is sure we shouldn't answer: 'How do humans throughout history approach other humans of a strange culture? They fight them. The risks of reply are just terrible. To them, we may be the finest beef animals ever.' If Hibbs' advice is taken, we would only listen—like beasts in the jungle. But what if the extraterrestrials reason the same way? The final, monumental irony of the great quest would be: Everybody listening and nobody sending." ("Life Out There?" *Newsweek*, Feb. 22, 1960)

## AMERICA'S SOCIAL FRONTIERS

### MORE AND BETTER HOMES

*A former editor of House & Home urges two measures to ease the housing shortage.*

**A. M. Watkins**

The constant excessive rise in building costs keeps our home-building industry from operating at a rate which can approach the country's needs. It forces the use of cheap materials and techniques to cut initial costs. But cheap houses waste money in the long run because the upkeep is high and they don't last long.

"High quality design and construction will not be enough. Standardization and mass production are also urgently needed. . . . The building industry is saddled with waste and inefficiency largely because so many little parts and pieces have to be put together by hand at the site of each new house." Mass-production techniques can cut the costs of various parts of a house; a standard central core unit combining all the major utilities could reduce the total cost of our houses by an estimated 10 to 15 per cent.

But there are "more than 2,000 different and conflicting building codes in the United States, each with its own differing rules specifying how a house should be built and how the various equipment such as plumbing and heating must be made and installed. Our wildly archaic building codes, in short, are a principal obstruction to the use of money-saving standardization and mass-production techniques in house construction." Real technical progress cannot be achieved until we have a system of modern, uniform codes, for the same reasons we have standard-gauge railroad tracks, and standard 115-volt electricity.

"A National Building Code Commission should be formed to work out a uniform building code for houses, as Canada is already doing. Its acceptance by the states should be voluntary just as cities in New York can voluntarily adopt the state's pioneering building code. (In its ten years on the books, the New York State code has been adopted by about half of all municipalities with more than 5,000 people.) But model code legislation should be written in advance to allow quick acceptance by each state's legislature, and thus forestall changes by pressure groups."

Objections that climatic variations require different codes in different states can be met by allowing for a few necessary modifications.

"If we are to realize the full benefits of mass production, we will need much more fundamental research. There have been so few major advances in housing construction chiefly because of the appalling lack of research. Economist John K. Galbraith has commented that very little research is ever done in industries 'where the firms are numerous and small.' Housing is the classic example. . . . A National Housing Research Center should be established to do for housing what the National Bureau of Standards now does for government agencies and sixteen different branches of private industry. An NHRC is essential not only for carrying out basic research on new methods and products, but also to set up quality standards (so consumers can protect themselves against shoddy construction). It would also provide the technical expertise and facilities to implement the administration of a national building code." ("A Good House Nowadays Is Hard to Find," *Harper's Magazine*, February 1960)

**A uniform  
national code**

**A national research  
center**

## THE FORGOTTEN FARM WORKER

*Discrimination against farm workers in state and federal legislation is detailed in a report by Robin Myers for the National Advisory Committee on Farm Labor, a citizens' organization.*

**Robin Myers**

The three million Americans who work for wages on farms are excluded from the wage and hour provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Only Hawaii and Puerto Rico provide unemployment compensation. Although agriculture is the third most hazardous industry, only three states require workman's compensation similar to that provided for other workers. Farm labor is excluded from all federal legislation that protects the rights of workers to organize and bargain collectively.

Worst off are the migrants, made up largely of minority groups. Many are Negroes, once sharecroppers or owners of a small piece of land. Others are citizens of Mexican descent, often still Spanish-speaking. A sizable East Coast group is from Puerto Rico.

**Migrant families**

As nonresidents wherever they go, the nearly one million members of migrant families are usually ineligible under local assistance and relief laws. The legal disadvantages of the migrants reflect their lack of political influence. Few of them can meet the legal requirements for voting.

"From 150,000 to 600,000 children of migrant agricultural workers suffer from all the disadvantages . . . that handicap the whole migrant community. . . . Two aspects of the migrant situation particularly affect the children. . . . The first is the use of child workers, both legally and illegally. The second is the deprivation of such educational opportunities as would enable them to make their own lives an improvement over those of their parents." (*The Position of Farm Workers in Federal and State Legislation*. Available through Readers Service)

## THE ENDURING INDIAN

*The President of the American Association on Indian Affairs writes:*

**Oliver La Farge**

"Most Indian groups in the United States, after more than 100 years of Euro-American contact and in spite of strong external pressures, both direct and fortuitous, have not become assimilated in the sense of the loss of community identity and the full acceptance of American habits of thought and conduct. Nor can one expect such group assimilation within any predictable time period, say one to four generations. The urge to retain tribal identity is strong and operates powerfully for many Indian groups.

"The vanishing Indian, in other words, is not vanishing. . . .

"Despite everything, the tribes are still here. The Indian population now numbers close to half a million, and is increasing by nearly 5 per cent per annum. . . . By and large, the Indians are extremely poor. They live in scattered communities, few of which exceed 50,000 and many of which number less than 1,000. Their health is worse than that of any other racial group in the country—the average life-expectancy of the Papago Indians of Arizona, in a most salubrious climate, is seventeen years. Yet the Indians and most of their communities are going to continue into the future. . . .

"Present Indian culture could be represented by a parallelogram of forces, in which the current attitudes, emotions, and ways of responding to situations are the product of the action upon each other of the aboriginal

Indian culture  
runs deep

culture and the culture that the white man has brought or imposed. The Indians' old way of life differed enormously from that of the present. It was a rhythmic alternation of activities—hunting, fighting, planting, cultivating, harvesting, performance of ceremonies—with intervals of leisure. What they did went by the seasons, the positions of the sun, the occurrence of need.

"Those ways have been shattered, and little has been available to replace them. With some exceptions, especially in the Southwest, the outward manifestations of their cultures have been abandoned except as reminiscent public functions, assertions of identity, such as the pasteurized sun dances staged annually by many Plains tribes. Deep down the cultural stream runs strong and, it seems, cannot be choked off. An educated modern Sioux tribal official may tell you confidentially that some of the old men say he is *wakan*—touched by the influence of God—and that sometimes he wonders if this is not so. In the old days many tribes were contemptuous of the accumulation of property and of individual self-assertion; this pattern still inhibits Indians in competition for jobs and promotion, or in reciting and asking questions in college classrooms. When white advisers have had the sense to work with this trait, instead of fighting it, they find it leads to strength in community endeavors and progress.

"One effect of the Indians' historical experience has been a development of frustration, resentment and dependency—qualities that can too often be observed in modern Indians. At [a recent] conference of anthropologists the participants agreed that most Indians concur in these assumptions about their situation: 'that Indians can expect no long-term consistency in policies affecting them; that the interests of the dominant society will take precedence over their own in any policy decisions; that Indians can do little to affect decisions concerning themselves; that the turning over of Indian affairs to the states is inevitable; and that state administration is more likely to be hostile to Indians than is the Federal administration.' " ("The Enduring Indian," *Scientific American*, February 1960)

*In a series of twelve articles in the Denver Post, Robert W. Fenwick reported his findings on "America's Lost People."*

Robert W. Fenwick

"I traveled Wyoming, Nebraska, South Dakota, and Montana. I covered reservations, the poverty-ridden 'pup-towns' on the reservations and the sordid, gaudy, blood-and-wine-soaked skid rows of border towns.

"I interviewed scores of Indians and their tribal leaders, Government officials, priests and ministers at missions, hospitals and community centers for Indians; talked to Congressmen, ranchers, businessmen, law-enforcement officers, social workers and ordinary citizens exposed to Indian influences.

"I was shocked by what I heard and saw: Unbelievable drunken orgies paid for with relief moneys; poverty, disease, filth and overcrowding; uninhibited lovemaking in public; young Indian girls in prostitution; widespread illegitimacy subsidized by welfare funds, degeneracy, lawlessness, murder."

In almost every settlement, the Indians' original "land-base" had been systematically nibbled away by stupid or indifferent administration. On the reservations themselves erosion has taken a terrible toll. There was a similar deterioration in the character of the people themselves. The old tribal society no longer suits the times, while the Indians' bad health—and their inferior status in town and industry—makes it almost impossible for them to erect a proper substitute. Schooling is neglected. The Indian's crime rate is out of all proportion to his numbers. (*Denver Post*, Jan. 3-15, 1960)

## MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK

### DO POLITICS AND SCIENCE MIX?

*Can the public be involved in political decisions that require understanding of complex scientific matters? A political scientist at the University of Wisconsin draws conclusions based on fluoridation referenda.*

Morris Davis

"The rash of referenda on fluoridation has been brought about by public officials who were unwilling to be responsible for so controversial a subject and handed the issue over to a confused and inexperienced public. But the controversial nature of the issue makes it unfit for such a test, because it will . . . be defeated often not on its merits but because it is unfamiliar. In such a case the public may well be far less to blame than the poor timing of the crusaders. The issue is a strange one, and the public not too stupid in voting it down for that reason alone. It is unreasonable to shout a few statistics at the public, have the opposition scream a few slogans back, and then expect the public to decide either wisely or at all. Public opinion, in other words, has at present a role in the fluoridation issue that it cannot adequately fill.

"If the public is to be given a part in deciding about the adoption of a scientific advance like fluoridation, then it must be educated to its task. If it reacts against what seems unnatural, then the haze of strangeness and occultness must be ripped from the notion. It is enough at the beginning that people know that there is such a thing as fluorine, that it is similar to chlorine, and that many communities use it. Only when people are not afraid of the term can the merits of the case be brought up.

"Such a conclusion has, I believe, application of wider significance than to fluoridation alone. For if lay publics are to be allowed to have any influence on the acceptance and utilization of scientific advancements, then at the least the place of science and the general patterns of scientific method must be understood by and familiar to the public.

scientists

Suspicion of

"It is to be doubted if this is the case at present. While the intellectual may very well know that a scientist is rational, empirical, and objective, what would ordinary people think? Will they not perhaps think of scientists as strange, distant persons, manipulating unknown symbols and instruments for, at most, hazily perceived purposes, holding secret experiments with human and animal guinea pigs, leading us into terrifying and incomprehensible situations, and about to destroy the world? From that point of view, scientists would be about the last persons to be believed and trusted, just as they are the furthest removed of all people from good, natural common sense. Add to this the fact that occasionally some scientists disagree with the bulk of their colleagues, and the conclusion easily follows that science is not only foreign and unnatural but worthless, because it can be used to prove anything, *just like statistics*. Then it is simple enough to raise the cry: 'Why gamble?' or 'Who knows?'

"The difficulty, of course, stems from the fact that mere literacy, which was almost sufficient as a hallmark of an educated citizenry in generations past, simply does not suffice for an age of rapid change and technological complexity. If publics are to decide on scientific questions, they must be able to penetrate to the merits of the cases. This they cannot do until they are at least somewhat familiar with scientific method and outlook, until

they can view without fear and suspicion the work of scientists because they have some general and correct information about what scientists do. It is folly for the public to be allowed to decide what is to be done with scientific achievements if their decision rests on whether or not they believe in scientific method, just as it would be folly for them to be allowed to choose political candidates if they did not have some commitment to the appropriate political system.

"If one believes that it is ethically preferable that as large numbers of people as possible affect the decisions on issues important to them, then he must also believe that they should be educated enough to express their opinions on real issues." ("Community Attitudes Toward Fluoridation," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Winter 1959-60)

*How the citizen should be educated in science is set forth by a professor of physics at Massachusetts Institute of Technology.*

**Jerrold R.  
Zacharias**

"What I would ask from the schools is an honest effort to convey to all their students some reasonable awareness of what science is, what it does, why it does it, and how it does it. I ask, in other words, nothing more than the poets ask, and have been in some degree getting. An appreciation of poetry is instilled into children from the earliest moment that they are capable of responding to it—at least, this is the intention. It continues through the grade schools, through the high schools, and through college. It is certainly not done with any intention of turning out whole generations of poets and essayists and critics; it is done because of a belief that an appreciation of literature, and a knowledge of literature, are part of the intellectual baggage of any educated man—a belief that a man who has never read Shakespeare is very likely not to have anything worthwhile to say. In this Age of Science, I am equally uneasy about the man who has not read Einstein or Bohr.

"But it must be made clear that this 'appreciation of science' is possible only to those who have 'done' science. Physics, biology, chemistry are, above all, methods of coming into touch with Nature, and they can be comprehended only in the doing. It is not enough to read about them, or hear about them—one must participate.

**Participation  
is essential**

"Let me introduce an analogy that is surprisingly apt. I know the rules of baseball, and I know the rules of cricket; I know something about the history of both games. When I watch a baseball game, I watch it with all my being. My muscles twitch when the batter lets a curve slide over the corner of the plate; I feel the ball burrow into the webbing of the glove when the third baseman lunges for a smash down the line. But when I watch a cricket match, I am merely watching grown men hit hard balls with sticks. The difference? I played baseball when I was young. I played it badly and I played it with no great devotion, but from time to time I was out on the field running and fielding and batting, and I therefore have a knowledge of baseball—a visceral knowledge—that is entirely different in kind from the knowledge I have of cricket.

"An honest education in science will make the student capable of understanding the world in which he lives—a world upon which science impinges at every moment and in every aspect. But beyond that, he will be in a position to participate in science in exactly the sense that he participates in the World Series. He will be able to follow science intelligently, have at least a glimmer of comprehension of moves that he himself could not possibly have made, and share in the intense satisfaction of achievement and progress." (*The Nation's Children*, Vol. 2)

# MAN'S RELATION TO MAN

## SIT-INS AGAINST SEGREGATION

*Observers on the scene and far away from it sought to explain the Negro student lunch-counter sit-ins in the South and to evaluate them as a way of ending racial segregation. Max Lerner, writing from India, noted that the technique originated with Mahatma Gandhi.*

**Max Lerner**

"The question for whites and Negroes alike is whether this kind of non-violent direct action is likely to evoke or be met with violence. . . . Gandhi was dealing with a humanist British tradition, whatever its sins in India. That is why the Gandhi method has until now never been used outside India. Even now there is a question about how effective it will be.

"Gandhi was leading a vast population against a foreign government which formed a tiny fraction of the people. In the South there are two populations, white and Negro, the latter usually in a minority. Where there are two populations you cannot make disciplined decisions on both sides. . . .

"It is a baffling technique to meet and a difficult one to carry out. Gandhi was always there to plead for the purity of his method. . . . The American Negroes are almost the last Christians in America in the sense of taking their religion with serious simplicity. If anyone should be able to make the method work, they should." (*New York Post*, Feb. 22, 1960)

**The Commonweal**

"Certainly it will not help the cause of interracial justice in the South if smoldering feelings of anger and hatred are fanned into flame by more ugly incidents. . . . The lunch-counter protest movement . . . seems peculiarly liable to eruptions of open conflict. . . . The passive demonstrations at the lunch counters require that the Negro students enter a hostile situation and defy, even if politely, the face-to-face orders of angry whites. In the famous . . . Montgomery, Alabama, bus boycott, there was no need for any such face-to-face encounter. . . . All the Montgomery Negroes had to do, for the most part, was to accept the physical hardship of walking. . . .

"It may be significant that the lunch-counter movement has moved outside the stores in a few Southern cities, and that at least one group of Negro students has formally announced its intention of boycotting segregated stores. This procedure, we think, is ultimately more realistic, and certainly safer, than the tactics of lunch-counter sit-downs." ("The Negro Sit-Down," *The Commonweal*, Mar. 11, 1960)

**Harry Golden**

"This latest movement gained a new dimension because the students are conditioned to the Gandhi-like policy of nonviolent resistance. This was exemplified by Dr. Martin Luther King, leader of the Montgomery, Alabama, bus strike. When the terrorists tossed a bomb on his porch at the height of the strike, Dr. King led his followers in asking God's forgiveness for the men who tossed the bomb. This is a shattering exhibition to the segregationist, for he has long maintained that the Negro is emotionally unstable. Yet the Negro has been displaying a phenomenal self-discipline. . . .

"Because of all of this the Negro now commands the battle. He not only possesses two powerful weapons, but he also knows how to use them with maximum effect. The first weapon is the economic buying power of the emerging Negro middle class. The Negro has been encouraged to use this

**Time  
from  
Montgomery, Ala.**

power, particularly in the purchase of luxury goods, by the Southern merchant. The Southerner gave the Negro his second weapon as well. It is the ultimate weapon—Christianity—and the Negro is using it." (*Life*, Mar. 14, 1960)

"Today's young Negro is a far cry from his grandfather and father," says a white resident of Montgomery. . . ." The older Negro people were brought up in rural areas "and soon learned that the white man had absolute control over them. They were afraid to do anything. Today's students have never had a chance to learn that fear. They have been raised in bigger towns and cities . . . have had more contact with the world. They aren't afraid anymore."

"The college Negro is generally away from home, safe from a situation in which retribution . . . could be visited on his family. He has economic freedom. 'Adults,' says a Montgomery Negro leader, 'have a debt on their house. They need their paycheck. It isn't easy for them to agitate for freedom. But it is for these college boys and girls.'" (Mar. 21, 1960)

**Southern  
Regional Council**

White Southerners have almost always underestimated the extent of Negro dissatisfaction. Consequently, they have always been shocked when Negroes demand something which the whites had hardly bothered to notice they didn't have. "The white leadership of the South has hardly yet begun to conceive the dimensions of change. . . ."

Among the alternatives: "one is to maintain segregation. This is to invite a test of strength . . . in which the apostles of violence will inevitably take over. . . . A second is to eliminate the beleaguered facility. Abolish lunch counters this time, and whatever else it is next time (schools, perhaps). The end of this is to have nothing left that is recognizable as a community. A third . . . alternative is equal treatment. If Southerners are sensible . . . treatment will be equally good; if Southerners prefer, it can be equally bad." (*The Student Protest Movement*, Winter 1960)

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## **WHERE CAN NONWHITES LIVE?**

*A series of comprehensive studies of housing for racial minorities has been completed under the auspices of the Commission on Race and Housing, a citizens' organization financed by the Fund for the Republic. In his introduction to Housing and Minority Groups, co-editor Nathan Glazer summarizes the results of investigations in nine cities.*

**Nathan Glazer**

"Prejudice in its pure form—that is to say, as unreasoning and inflexible antipathy—rarely plays a decisive role in the determination of the housing of minority groups. It is in the South that the role of prejudice may be seen perhaps in its sharpest form. And yet even here every action of discrimination—and there is discriminatory behavior by builders, renters, lenders, government and other groups—is based on economic factors in the situation somewhat independent of prejudice. In the North the relatively small role of pure prejudice is even more striking. Negroes are highly segregated and have poor housing. But the decisive factors in this poor housing are Negro economic weakness and white middle-class fears of the deterioration of neighborhoods on Negro entry. In lower-class areas of northern cities, it is not atypical for nonwhite and white groups to live together, and for nonwhites and whites to compete for housing on roughly the same basis. Nor is there necessarily a pattern of flight of whites from such areas."

**Importance of  
income**

The values of a middle-class neighborhood include quiet, protection from violence, cleanliness and good schools. Since none of these exist in the slums, there is nothing to protect against the presumed impact of nonwhite invasion. White residents of middle-class neighborhoods generally feel, however, that these values are threatened by the entry of any lower-income group, whether white or not.

A rise in the income of minority groups is very likely to improve their housing, even though prejudice and segregation remain. Few well-to-do nonwhites are badly housed. In some ways the North presents more problems for upper-income Negroes than the South. Here the problem is to get not only good housing, but good unsegregated housing, which is out of the question in the South.

Middle-class Negroes are handicapped by the fact that they are still a small minority of their own race. The white property owner fears that middle-class Negroes will soon be followed by lower-class Negroes.

Nevertheless, reduction of prejudice by itself can greatly improve the housing of nonwhites. The presence of liberal-minded builders in Houston, New Orleans, and several other Southern cities has led to better housing for Negroes than market forces alone might have provided.

An effective program to improve minority housing should proceed on several fronts. Reduced prejudice among whites, together with higher income and the development of middle-class values among nonwhites are trends which will reinforce each other. Better housing, however, will do little to eliminate the other handicaps of minorities. While poor housing can defeat efforts to rise on the social scale, good housing by itself is not sufficient to start any such movement.

Color alone remains a severe handicap, especially for Negroes. We cannot understand prejudice merely as a rationale for economic exploitation or merely as a reaction to real and unpleasant social characteristics. It is also a deep reaction to physical characteristics which have developed important and wide-ranging symbolic overtones as the result of a long and painful history. The development of a large Negro middle class will change the whole character of anti-Negro prejudice, but Negroes will still be a long way from taking up the status of assimilated Europeans. The Mexicans and Puerto Ricans, because of their lighter color, will find it easier.

*A Commission study by Luigi Laurenti, economist, finds no support for the belief that entry of nonwhites into a neighborhood causes property values to decline.*

**Luigi Laurenti**

Where nonwhites buy houses, real estate values are four times more likely to rise or remain constant than where housing remains all white. Analysis of nine years of real estate transactions in the San Francisco Bay area and Philadelphia, with supporting evidence from Chicago, Kansas City, Detroit and Portland, shows that 41 per cent of neighborhoods entered by nonwhites showed no change in prices. In 44 per cent of such neighborhoods prices rose between 5 and 26 per cent. Only 15 per cent showed a decline, ranging from 5 to 9 per cent.

The contrary belief has arisen because slums are commonly inhabited by minority groups. However, other economic factors—such as the pressure toward illegal conversion of buildings—are more important than race in determining real estate values within slums.

The evidence also indicates that nonwhites were maintaining their properties at least as well as white homeowners in comparable areas. Because the nonwhites who manage to enter all-white neighborhoods generally are

#### Realtors' attitudes

more educated than their new neighbors, their ability and willingness to maintain property is generally greater.

Panic is occasionally responsible for declining property values. The sale of one house to a nonwhite family may induce fear and widespread selling. This increases the supply of housing and may cause temporary price declines. Such situations have sometimes been exploited by unscrupulous real estate men of both races in a process called "block-busting." One house is sold to a nonwhite whose neighbors then are stampeded into selling for less than they would normally obtain.

Real estate opinion has moved away from the position that any entry of nonwhites into a neighborhood is catastrophic. The growing number of integrated neighborhoods suggests a growing sense of responsibility in the profession. But the Real Estate Board's code of ethics does not specifically forbid discrimination in housing, and many realtors practice discrimination to their ultimate financial loss.

The important question is whether, as segregation barriers weaken, whites will be willing to buy into mixed neighborhoods sufficiently to maintain values. Whites seem to be less alarmed by nonwhites so long as the proportion does not rise too high. There is some evidence that stable interracial neighborhoods are becoming more common. As exclusive neighborhoods become fewer, race should gradually lose its significance as a consideration in the real estate market. (*Property Values and Race*)

*Another Commission study suggests that the chances of maintaining racially integrated neighborhoods are good.*

#### George and Eunice Grier

Almost two thirds of the known communities built with a deliberate intent to attract an interracial market have a majority of whites. In only a few was the white majority obtained by quotas or other controls. In most it was the natural result of market forces.

Since the beginning of this study in 1955, interest in open-occupancy, privately developed housing has grown rapidly. Although interracial projects are few compared to the total volume of building (8,000 out of some 10 million units built in the period studied), they are becoming steadily more common.

The experience of the pioneers indicates that no community can be counted on to be hospitable to an interracial development. Obstructive zoning, pressure on landowners and impossibly strict applications of building codes are used to discourage interracial builders. In many cases, even such pressures did not succeed. Occasional violence also failed.

#### FHA policy

Two attempts, in California and Michigan, were obstructed by FHA officials. Since 1954, however, FHA policy has been designed to encourage the development of demonstration open-occupancy projects in suitably located key areas.

Interracial developers have usually been able to find qualified Negro buyers, but in some cases they have had to make special sales efforts to secure the number of white residents they wished.

Few problems arise when houses are occupied. The primary difficulties occur during the earlier phases of buying land, financing, and recruiting buyers. The white market for interracial housing is much broader than had been thought—in income, occupation, household structure, education, and ethnic background.

Interracial housing is not yet fruitful for the builder interested in maximum profit and minimum risk, but only a few of the projects studied resulted in serious loss. (*Privately Developed Interracial Housing*)

## THE MASS MEDIA

### FREEDOM OF THE OUTDOORS

*A San Francisco advertising executive questions whether outdoor advertising has a right to exist.*

**Howard Gossage**

"Outdoor advertising is peddling a commodity it does not own, and without the owner's permission: your field of vision. . . . The Taj Mahal, street signs, . . . even a garbage dump, however they may intrude on the eye . . . have other functions as well. A billboard has no other function; it is there for the sole and express purpose of trespassing on your field of vision. . . . Moreover, this invasion of your privacy is compounded by its resale to a third party. It is as though a Peeping Tom, on finding a nice window, were to sell peeps at two bits a head. . . .

"Do laws that discriminate against outdoor advertising discriminate against every other advertising medium? The answer is yes—if you regard Outdoor as an advertising medium. . . . An advertising medium is a medium which incidentally carries advertising, but whose primary function is to provide something else: entertainment, news, matches, telephone listings, anything. I'm afraid the poor old billboard doesn't qualify as a medium at all; its medium, if any, is the scenery around it and that is not its to give away." ("How to Look at Billboards," *Harper's Magazine*, February 1960)

*The Washington editor of the Reader's Digest emphasizes the threat to the new interstate highway system and urges readers to organize against the billboard lobbies in state capitals.*

**Charles Stevenson**

In spite of earlier assurances that they would accept state controls, the billboard "lobbyists today swarm through state capitals all over the country, trying to beat back proposals to raise standards. . . . It is a campaign replete with misrepresentation, fancy flimflam and outright lies."

The billboard lobby, according to former New York State Senator Thomas C. Desmond, "puts many legislators in its debt by giving them free sign space during election time, and it is savage against the legislator who dares oppose it. It subsidizes his opposition, . . . donates sign space to his opponents and sends agents to spread rumors among his constituents." ("The Great Billboard Scandal of 1960," *Reader's Digest*, March 1960)

*The editors of Fortune comment on a new development in outdoor advertising, the Skyjector.*

**Fortune**

"It may be true that the U.S. is lagging in ICBM's, but there is some comfort in the knowledge that . . . we are first in the field with a Swiss invention known as the Skyjector . . . [which] can enlarge a four-by-six-inch slide 75 million times and hurl it a distance of five miles against the backdrop of a building, a mountain, a cloud, or even the open sky at night."

James Crosby, who holds Western Hemisphere rights to Skyjector, "is now planning to tour the U.S., and shoot messages into the sky at . . . \$3,000 for a forty-five minute display period.

"For many years a small band of dedicated citizens has been struggling to defend scenic America against the desecration of billboard advertising." They won a small but heartening victory when the Federal highway building act "provided a bonus to states that prohibit billboards within 660 feet

of the new roads. Recently, however, certain promoters have circumvented this restriction . . . [through] such devices as the 'Hi-Sign,' a structure 80 feet high and 100 feet wide, which 'will transmit your sales messages over surprising distances.' Now comes the Skyjector with its frightening potential of visibility for fifteen miles.

"Young Mr. Crosby . . . says of the Skyjector's work: 'It comes, it goes, and it leaves no scar.' No scar, eh? When Americans . . . find *that* kind of handwriting in the sky, they may get a feeling more oppressive than the menace of Soviet missiles." ("Billboard in the Sky," *Fortune*, March 1960)

## WHAT IS NEWS?

Arthur T. Hadley

"To understand how our knowledge of the world is affected by the press we have to look at the factors affecting selection of what becomes news.

"For example, it costs more to get news from southeast Asia than from France. The cost is greater both in terms of the cable tolls and in the expense of maintaining a reporter in the area. Therefore, the tendency is to report more news from France. . . . That makes France seem more important to us. . . . More reporters go to France. More news reaches us about France . . . and so the cycle continues."

This "self-reflexive" nature of news also operates to increase the amount of news from Washington, thus increasing the importance of men and events there, decreasing the coverage of state and local affairs and officials, and consequently building up demand for more Washington news.

The necessity for speed in reporting, trying to beat the competition, and for compressing the news report into limited space or time, reinforces a tendency "to concentrate on the known, the easily explainable, the development of a story already there, rather than to strike out to grasp the difficult detail of truth. . . .

"Profoundly influencing news selection is a vast mythology that has grown up about what is and is not news." Business and economics and military news in time of peace were not considered news until recently. "Almost all the facts about our human environment that are being uncovered by the able social scientists don't get in the news. The whole process by which our laws evolve through court decisions is largely overlooked. . . .

"Then there is accident. Accident plays a far greater part in determining what becomes news than is usually admitted. Is anything else important happening that day?" The fear of offending advertisers or minority groups can also affect the selection of "events to be the news."

"In considering the effect of the drive for circulation on news selection and therefore our knowledge of the world, the key is that bad news draws more people than good news, and exciting, shocking bad news does the best. . . . Then the self-reflexive principle starts to work. Through the press the body politic is informed about a continuous series of crises, often multiple. . . . The human organism either reacts by becoming numb or else by lashing out blindly. The wonder is that the body politic does not more often react in the same way. As it is, we see an increasing number of such reactions, called in psychology the 'all or none' reactions: outlaw atomic weapons—start a preventive war; we must be first in everything—we're spending ourselves into bankruptcy; complete integration by yesterday—lynch the bums. Then each of these reactions, being bad news, becomes in itself news; and so the self-reflexive nature of the news takes over and we stagger into a fresh crisis."

The need to simplify

Bad news comes first

Influenced by all these factors, the selection of news we receive "gives us a picture of the world that does not always correspond to the actual world. Therefore, the world's problems often have to be solved on two distinct levels. The problem must be solved as it actually exists—and often it is very hard to get information about this. The problem must also be solved as it exists in the public mind. For in a democracy, unless people are convinced the problem is solved, the problem will remain even though it may not actually be there any longer. To solve a problem only as it appears in the press and leave the actual problem untouched can lead some day to national suicide." ("Modern Communication in an Age of Crisis," *Texas Quarterly*, Winter 1959)

*The adventitious nature of news-gathering from Latin America is revealed by Dean Edward W. Barrett and Professor Penn T. Kimball of the Graduate School of Journalism, Columbia University.*

**Edward W. Barrett  
and  
Penn T. Kimball**

Latin American sources time their release of news with the important local morning papers in mind. As a result, "a flood of copy reaches New York between 8 and 10 o'clock in the evening—a poor time for anything short of a front-page story to develop for use in most North American morning papers. By the time the next day's afternoon papers are being made up the news item has grown stale and is discarded on the desk in favor of late-breaking developments elsewhere."

Costs inhibit the maintenance of complete staffs of U. S. correspondents in all Latin American countries. Anti-United States feelings, the explosive character of political and economic developments, sheer physical difficulties and the normal obstacles of cross-cultural reporting all compound the task of getting at the background and interpretation.

"The Latin American beat calls for the highest professional skills. Yet, realistically it should be pointed out that Latin American posts are not considered 'prestige' posts. . . . Reputations are easier to make in Europe or the Far East. The Latin American specialist often finds himself in a dead end within his editorial hierarchy. . . . World War II helped create a correspondent corps with backgrounds and attachments in many parts of the world, but few of these veterans have ever been south of Havana or Mexico City. . . .

**Why news  
is read**

"An interview survey of New Yorkers during a recent newspaper strike pointed up the phenomenon that Americans often do the 'right' thing for the 'wrong' reason: Many of those interviewed indicated that they read the news daily not purely for the sake of informing themselves but rather to avoid seeming uninformed. . . .

"This suggests that the monopoly newspaper, now the rule in 90-odd per cent of American cities, has an opportunity that was less evident in the days when it felt compelled to outshout its competition in sensationalized reports on murder, rape and miscellaneous skullduggery. By giving the vital or broad-gauged report from Latin America the prominence he feels it deserves, the editor can possibly induce readership among those who are looking for social cues as to what is important. Here, in brief, is a case where the dubious characteristics of monopoly and of keeping-up-with-the-Joneses might well be harnessed for constructive purposes.

"The press has a responsibility to lead as well as follow the aspirations of its audience. And this can be practical as well as right. . . . The history of our press is rich with examples of audiences that awaited only the chance to be cultivated." ("The Role of the Press and Communications," *The U. S. and Latin America*)

## MISCELLANY

### THE THEORY OF DETERRENT WAR

H. F. Ellis  
in Punch

"Would anybody who happens to be as muddled as I am care to accompany me on a brief investigation into the present state of the theory of deterrents?

"Originally, the thing was simple. America had the atom bomb, and the possibility of its use in retaliation was reckoned to be enough to deter all those millions of Russians from flooding across Western Europe. Good.

"Then Russia acquired atom bombs, and the certainty of their use in retaliation for the employment by America of atom bombs to stop a conventional attack by Russia made the deterrent an uncomfortably double-edged weapon. Not so good.

"Both sides now produced hydrogen bombs, of such power that it became unlikely that either side would risk using them, *unless* of course, Russia supposed that a surprise attack might render her opponents incapable of retaliation. This uncomfortable proviso robbed the hydrogen bomb of much of its initial charm, for a deterrent which may be destroyed before it can be used ceases to deter.

"The perfecting of rockets for the delivery of deterrents increased the complexity of the situation, by cutting down the available warning time, and led to the policy of the mobile or hidden deterrent. Rockets began to go underground or, better, to move about in submarines under ice-caps and in other inaccessible places. It is clearly useless, or at any rate no safeguard, to destroy an enemy country by surprise when its retaliatory power is elsewhere, perhaps at the bottom of the North Sea. The deterrent, in its mobile role, seemed to be on the upgrade again.

"Admittedly, there are certain difficulties in the exercise of overwhelming retaliatory power from the sea-bed. A good deal of responsibility rests with the submarine commander, who may find himself after the first two minutes or so without coherent orders from home, if any. In particular, it will be a problem for him in his watery lair to know when to stop, unless indeed one is to contemplate the possibility that he will have his Government with him. It is conceivable, I suppose, in these split-second days, that both the American President and Mr. Khrushchev might find it expedient to deter each other from submarines—in which case any meetings arranged between them would be not so much at the Summit as in the Abyss. But it must always be remembered, when discussing the arrangements for nuclear war, that the whole purpose is to ensure that the weapons do *not* go off. It is therefore only necessary for each side to convince the other of the *possibility* of instant retaliation: not to prove that an affair which is designed not to start would go off smoothly if it did. We are perhaps out of order in raising such academic problems as the transmission of orders to *stop*.

"In any case, this discussion is not yet up to date. Mr. Khrushchev's secret weapon has again confused a situation that for a moment threatened to become clear. We know little about this weapon as yet, beyond the fact that it is either 'fantastic' or 'incredible,' according to which translator you follow. This makes it all the more difficult to deter. If, for instance, it is some kind of contrivance for making the oceans boiling hot at the press of a button, it is probably useless for America to continue to build missile-

Down Summit,  
up Abyss

**Bases in  
space?**

carrying submarines. She must get her rockets into satellites, or at least announce that she has a plan to put rockets into satellites, at the earliest possible moment.

"It is true that Mr. Khrushchev's new weapon is not yet ready. It is still, in his own words, 'in the portfolios of the scientists and designers.' But here again we have to remind ourselves that in deterrent warfare, an anti-deterrent need not be available to be effective. What is not to be used need not, at any given moment, be there. I am sorry to labor so elementary a point, but it is one about which it is possible to become confused. Progress towards a new weapon must be balanced on the other side by progress towards a new deterrent that will be capable of deterring, or the whole balance of power is altered.

"Whither then, for the foreseeable future?

"As each new step forward is made in the development of ever more fantastic (or incredible) weapons, greater care must be taken to ensure that they cannot, in theory, be destroyed before they have a chance (again in theory) to retaliate. The search for safe bases becomes of paramount importance. In the absence of an agreement (which would call for much hard bargaining) whereby each side uses the territory of the other as a base for its deterrents, I do not think that the earth, or its waters, will much longer afford any really reliable and secure shooting-off points. The search inevitably must move outwards, into space: to sputniks, to the moon, to the planets. And therein, in my more optimistic moments, I see a gleam of hope.

"When Russia deters America from Mars, and America deters Russia from Venus, it seems clear to me that the incredibly fantastic weapons each will then possess (either on site or in portfolios) will be trained not towards points on earth but against each other. In nuclear, or post-nuclear, warfare it is of cardinal importance to knock out the enemy's main armament first. So there these terrible contraptions will sit, deterring each other like mad in a state of hair-trigger readiness. And suddenly, down here on poor old nerve-ridden Earth, it will occur to all the nations that it doesn't much matter whether the deterrents go off or not. We might find ourselves a couple of planets short and get into a rather eccentric orbit, but who will care about that? We shall be able to settle back into our old free-and-easy predeterrent ways, even to the extent, if we feel like it, of indulging in an old-fashioned conventional war." ("The Deterrent War," *Punch*, Jan. 27, 1960)

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## **SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY**

*The Senate Committee on National Policy Machinery urges better use of universities in our policy planning. However, Robert Bierstedt, President of the Eastern Sociological Society, implies that his colleagues would be of little value unless they broadened their inquiries.*

**Robert Bierstedt**

Imagine what would happen if "Veblen, Sumner, or Tocqueville were to present himself as a doctoral candidate at any of our leading departments of sociology today with a couple of sample chapters of his *chef-d'oeuvre* under his arm. He would almost certainly be advised to forget the whole thing and to turn instead—if you will forgive the language—to a study of the goal-structures and opportunity-structures of role-oriented actors. . . .

"Is sociology to be a niggling business, doing the easy thing because it is accurate, and avoiding the difficult thing because it is imprecise? . . . It is distressing to think that . . . the more precise our research becomes the more our science resembles the deaf man in Tolstoy, muttering answers to questions that no one has asked him. . . .

"Many of [our new] techniques are so complex, and many of our concepts so opaque, that they have interest and meaning only to other sociologists and have no relevance to the society at large. . . . Instead of setting for ourselves tasks of large dimensions and then devising methods appropriate to their solution, we are apt to ask only those questions that are answerable in terms of methods presently available. . . . But what an anemic ambition this is! . . . Where are the visions that enticed us into the world of learning in the first place? . . .

"The establishment of true propositions—the scientific task—may not be an altogether satisfactory or even desirable goal for some of our sociological endeavors. . . . In the present condition of our disciplines, and in the foreseeable future, we may be better advised to aim for cogency rather than for truth. . . .

"Objectivity may not be as desirable a criterion as it is commonly thought to be. . . . The greatest thinkers . . . have not been the neutral and objective ones, but those who have turned their biases to good account. And each biased conclusion, of course, is open to refinement, modification, and correction by others of a contrary kind, so that the outcome over the course of time is, if not knowledge in a narrow sense, a much more sophisticated appreciation of the problem than would otherwise be possible. . . . The reward can . . . be great if it helps us to construct a sociology that is responsive to the intellectual challenges of our time." ("Sociology and Humane Learning," *American Sociological Review*, February 1960)

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## ALSO NOTED

### ECONOMIC AID BY FREE CHOICE

Andrew Shonfield

"We have discovered that in this part of the twentieth century, at any rate, prosperity is divisible: the warnings that the economic difficulties of the primary producing countries would drag us all down have proved false. The industrial countries have never been so prosperous, and they have sustained their prosperity by trading more and more among themselves.

"By exploding the myth that we depend on the trade and prosperity of the poor countries to maintain our own standards of living in the West, the air has been cleared. We can now approach the problem of economic aid in a mood of deliberate choice. There are no phoney practical arguments to confuse our sentiments. We know that the technology available to the developed countries and the vast amount of new productive capacity that has been built up in the nineteen-fifties, both in the West and in Soviet Russia, can provide the necessary resources to give the underdeveloped countries a big and sustained push in the right direction. There is no material reason why, after another ten or fifteen years, anyone should ever go hungry again. . . .

"We have, in fact, reached the point of crisis. Unless the productive power of the underdeveloped countries is much increased during the next few years there is a danger that the standard of living in some places may actually begin to slip back from its appallingly low present level. Even if this is avoided, the task of bringing the underdeveloped countries to the

stage where they are able to advance rapidly on their own initiative will become much more difficult if it is left to the nineteen-seventies or nineteen-eighties; at that point of time there will be the competing demands of several hundred million more people clamoring to be fed, clothed, and given shelter." ("The Coming Attack on World Poverty," *The Listener*, Mar. 3, 1960)

#### REDEFINING ECONOMIC WORTH

*An essayist argues that economic policy should be more concerned with essential values that are ignored or misrepresented by the data on Gross National Product.*

Bertrand de Jouvenel

The very existence of society rests upon the care lavished by mothers on their children. But since mothers do not get paid, their activity does not figure in the Gross National Product. Yet if a mother takes a job and spends part of her wages to hire another woman to care for her children, the earnings of both are counted. "Surely we have here a biased picture." Such factors should not be omitted simply because they cannot be processed through the monetary mill. Free services and free goods should be taken into account.

So should negative goods or nuisances. A stream polluted by a factory is not charged against the economy, but an aqueduct built because of the pollution is counted as a gain. ("The Political Economy of Gratuity," *Virginia Quarterly Review*, Fall 1959)

#### FLEXIBILITY IN STRIKE SETTling

*The steel strike confirmed the need for new laws providing a choice of procedures for settling major strikes, according to a Harvard expert.*

Archibald Cox

New legislation should give the President his choice among a wide range of methods for intervening in strikes which seriously affect the public interest. He should be able to appoint fact-finding boards with power to recommend the terms of settlement and to assess blame, to seek injunctions lasting up to six months, and to seize and operate industrial property.

"Finally, the President should be given his most important power in explicit terms—the power to do nothing." The chief advantage of the choice-of-procedures approach lies in the preservation of uncertainty as to the form and extent of government intervention. With any set course of procedures, negotiations tend to run the full course before the parties settle down to business.

These are drastic remedies, but they are preferable to a labor court or wage regulation board with power to fix and enforce the terms of employment. Under the suggested procedures, the representatives of government could "persuade, cajole, and even threaten, but in the end they must secure agreement without the power to command. Thus, the suggested techniques preserve the challenge to creativity presented by the necessity for securing common consent." ("Strikes and the Public Interest," *Atlantic Monthly*, February 1960)

#### SURVIVAL OF THE SPECIES

Arthur Koestler

Hiroshima represented the beginning of a new era in which death is a constant possibility not only for the human individual but also for the human species. This fact has not yet penetrated people's minds; when it does, perhaps it will result in the same type of elevation of vision that the contemplation of individual mortality can produce. ("Reflections on the Year 15 P.H.," *The New York Times Magazine*, Mar. 20, 1960)

## EXCELLENCE AND EQUALITY

Each month Current will publish a lengthy reprint or condensation of material that seems to the editors of outstanding interest.

This month we publish the full text of an essay by the President of the Carnegie Corporation of New York dealing with a central problem in education.

Dr. Gardner's essay appeared originally in *The Nation's Children*, a series of three volumes published as a basis for the deliberations of the 1960 White House Conference on Children and Youth. The volumes contain thirty-five studies on problems that affect not only children but also American society as a whole.

The first volume, subtitled *The Family and Social Change*, covers the effects of such factors as population growth, the movement of population to suburbs and cities, improved health, rising income and the growth of leisure. The second volume, *Development and Education*, in which Dr. Gardner's essay appears, analyzes the gap between aspirations and accomplishments. The third volume, *Problems and Prospects*, deals with the critical problems facing rural youth, minority groups, and disturbed and delinquent children.

### John W. Gardner

William James once said, "Democracy is on trial, and no one knows how it will stand the ordeal. . . . What its critics now affirm is that its preferences are inveterately for the inferior. Mediocrity enthroned and institutionalized, elbowing everything superior from the highway, this, they tell us, is our irremediable destiny."

William James was quoting the critics of democracy. He himself did not believe that mediocrity was our destiny. And I do not think that most people today believe it. Certainly I do not. But we would be very foolish indeed if we ignored the danger.

One might suppose that nothing could be less controversial than the relative merits of mediocrity and excellence. Yet people who set out to promote excellence often find that they have got themselves into a slugging match they cannot possibly win. The truth is that when it comes to the pursuit of excellence, there are some ways of going about it which Americans will accept and some ways which are offensive to them. Anyone who believes—as I do—that the encouragement of excellence is about as important a goal as Americans could have today had better understand the hazards that line the course—and how to get around them. If anyone thinks that I am exaggerating the difficulties and wants to test this, let him launch a really vigorous campaign to promote excellence in his local school system—and see what happens.

In the first place, he will discover that there are people in the community who have very little fondness for democracy, and who never did believe in the widespread extension of educational opportunity. They will welcome his remarks in favor of excellence as an attack on democratic concepts of education and will promptly offer to join in on an attack on the school system. If he accumulates allies of that sort, his usefulness in the community will be at an end.

What we mean  
by equality

On the other side he will discover that there are some people in the community who believe that any reference to excellence is an attack upon American ideals of equality, and will accuse him of trying to create an elite.

At this point he will seriously consider going back to stamp-collecting, or bridge, or whatever that peaceful hobby was that he indulged in before becoming interested in the schools. Unless one knows precisely what one believes in and what is meant by excellence, one is going to have a difficult time of it. But there is no greater service that can be done for a community than to help it to think clearly about these issues.

There are a good many Americans who have a genuine desire for excellence but have never really been clear in their own minds as to whether this was at odds with American ideals of equality. This is a question with which we had better deal head-on. What do we mean by equality? Do we mean any more or less than the Irishman when he said, "I'm as good as you are, and a great deal better, too"? Let us see what we do mean.

The eighteenth-century philosophers who made *equality* a central term in our political vocabulary never meant to imply that men are equal in all respects, in all dimensions, in all attributes of their persons and their lives. Nor do Americans today take such a view. It is possible to state in fairly simple terms the views concerning equality that would receive most widespread endorsement in our country today. The most fundamental of these views is simply that in the final matters of human existence all men are equally worthy of our care and concern. Further, we believe that men should be equal in the enjoyment of certain familiar legal, civil, and political rights. They should be, as the phrase goes, equal before the law.

But men are unequal in their native capacities and in their motivations, and therefore in their attainments. The most widely accepted means of dealing with this problem has been to emphasize *equality of opportunity*. The great advantage of the conception of equality of opportunity is that it candidly recognizes differences in native capacity and in willingness to work and accepts the certainty of differences in achievement. By allowing free play to these differences it preserves the freedom to excel, which counts for so much in terms of individual aspiration and has produced so much of mankind's greatness.

Opportunity is never  
really equal

At the same time one must admit that the conception of equality has its limitations and ambiguities. In practice it means an equal chance to compete within the framework of rules established by the society in question; and this framework tends to favor certain kinds of people with certain kinds of gifts. This is unavoidable, but it is only proper that it be recognized. We must also recognize that in a society in which there are substantial differences from one family to another in wealth, learning, and concern for education, the formal equality of opportunity represented by free schooling may never erase the tremendous variations in opportunity represented by home background. In other words, we cannot assume that we have put our perplexities behind us when we assert our devotion to equality of opportunity.

So much for the conceptions of equality which would win almost universal acceptance in the United States today. But a good many Americans have gone considerably further in their equalitarian views. They have believed that no man should be regarded as better than another in any dimension.

**The tyranny of  
the least common  
denominator**

People holding this view have tended to believe, for example, that men of great leadership capacities, great energies, or greatly superior aptitudes are more trouble to society than they are worth. Merle Curti reminds us that in the Jacksonian era in this country, equalitarianism reached such heights that trained personnel in the public service were considered unnecessary. "The democratic faith further held that no special group might mediate between the common man and the truth, even though trained competence might make the difference between life and death." Thus in the West, even licensing of physicians was lax, because not to be lax was thought to be undemocratic.

In such efforts to force a spurious equality, we can detect not only the hand of the generous man who honestly regrets that some must lose the foot race, but the hand of the envious man who resents achievement, who detests superiority in others, who will punish eminence at every opportunity.

Whether through efforts of generous men or envious men, we have seen enough of this extreme equalitarianism to know what it implies. We have seen mediocrity breed mediocrity. We have seen the tyranny of the least common denominator.

In short, we now understand what Kierkegaard meant when he warned us of the danger of an equalitarianism so extreme as to be "unrelieved by even the smallest eminence." We now know what Flexner meant when he said, "We have to defend the country against mediocrity, mediocrity of souls, mediocrity of ideas, mediocrity of action. We must also fight against it in ourselves."

It is understandable that Americans should be cautious about excessive emphasis upon the difference in native capacity between one individual and another. Enemies of democracy have often cited the unequal capacities of men as justification for political and social philosophies which violate our most deeply held beliefs.

**The importance of  
individual differences**

But we cannot escape the fact of individual differences and we cannot escape the necessity of coping with them. Whether we like it or not, they are a central fact in any educational system—and indeed in any society. The good society is not one that ignores them but one that deals with them wisely and compassionately. This is the nub of the problem of excellence in a free society. It is the problem of dealing wisely and constructively with individual differences.

In education, for example, if we ignore individual differences we end up treating everyone alike—and one result is that we do not demand enough of our ablest youngsters. That is precisely the error we have made in recent decades. But if we toughen up the program and still ignore individual differences we only do an injustice to the average youngster who will have to drop by the wayside. The only solution is to admit that individuals differ and provide different treatment for different levels of ability. And never forget that we must do a good job at every level of ability. Our kind of society calls for the maximum development of individual potentialities at all levels.

But how does one provide different treatment for different levels of ability? That is where the arguments begin. Should we allow bright youngsters to skip grades, or should we observe the lockstep in which no one advances faster than anyone else? Should we have separate schools for the gifted as Admiral Rickover recommends, or comprehensive high schools as James B. Conant recommends?

I am not going to suggest specific solutions. I am going to lay down some

**Principles for the  
development of  
excellence**

principles to keep in mind if anything intelligent is to be done about this problem.

The first thing we must recognize if we are to deal wisely with individual differences is that Americans are extremely reluctant to put labels on differences in general capacity. This is a deeply rooted national characteristic and anyone who ignores it does so at his peril. We do not like any arrangement which seems to suggest that some youngsters in our schools are first-class citizens and others second-class citizens.

An example of this is to be found in the broad interpretation which we give to the phrase "college education." When youngsters are graduated from high school we discuss those going on to college as though they were a homogeneous lot, all headed for a similar experience. Actually, a behind-the-scenes view of the process will reveal that they are quietly but fairly effectively sorted out.

At the key point in the sorting process is the high-school dean. The students need not listen to his advice but usually do. He sends his college-bound students out along widely diverging pathways—to colleges of the highest possible standards, to colleges of moderate difficulty, and so on down to colleges which may actually be lower academically than the high school from which the youngster is being graduated. But although the essence of his job is to arrive at clear appraisals of the relative standings of colleges and the relative capacities of students, the high-school dean will ordinarily take considerable care not to make these appraisals explicit in his talks with students and parents.

This reluctance makes some critics extremely impatient. But this is a point on which the American people insist—and for my part I am glad that they do.

**Why Americans  
dislike labels**

One way of looking at this national reluctance to label individual differences is that it is nonsensical and that we have developed a ridiculous squeamishness about such matters. Critics trace it to our desire to make young people "happy," to our concern for psychological adjustment. But such critics are barking up the wrong tree. The reason we are reluctant to label individual differences in native capacity is that native capacity holds a uniquely important place in our scheme of things. It must never be forgotten that ours is one of the relatively few societies in the history of the world in which performance is a primary determinant of status. More than in any other society, in the United States the individual's standing is determined by his capacity to perform. In a stratified society—a class society—the individual's standing, his status, is determined by his family, by the class into which he was born. Performance is not an important factor in establishing the individual's status so he can afford to be less deeply concerned about his native capacity. In our society the individual's future depends to an unprecedented degree upon his native gifts.

Of course, we are oversimplifying matters greatly in using such general terms as "native capacity." There are all kinds of native capacity. That is a point to which we shall return later. But for complex reasons, Americans see appraisals of "intelligence," however defined, as total judgments on the individual and as central to his self-esteem.

Some critics note that we discriminate nicely between excellence and mediocrity in athletics, but refuse to be similarly precise about differences in intelligence; and they attribute this to the fact that we are more seriously concerned with athletic ability than with intelligence. Nothing could be further from the truth. We can afford, emotionally speaking, to be candid

**The principle of  
multiple chances**

and coldly objective in judgments of athletic ability precisely because we do not take these as total judgments on the individual and as necessarily central to his self-esteem.

The second fundamental point which must be understood by everyone who wants to deal constructively with individual differences in our society is what might be termed the principle of multiple chances. The European system of education separates youngsters at ten or eleven years of age, on the basis of ability, into two radically different school systems, one college preparatory and the other not. This is, in many respects, an efficient procedure. It solves many problems which plague our comprehensive high schools. It would never work in America, chiefly because early separation of the very gifted and the less gifted violates our principle of multiple chances.

We believe that the youngster should have many successive opportunities to discover himself. We postpone as long as possible any final closing of the door on the individual's chances. It is a unique feature of our system that the "late bloomer" is given repeated opportunities to prove himself. I do not need to dwell on the fact that this can be overdone. If the late bloomer passes up too many opportunities he may turn out to be a wilted blossom. But any plan devised to deal with individual differences in our educational system must be a plan in which the individual may try again, and again, and again. It would be exceedingly foolish to imagine that the American people are going to change their views on this subject.

**Excellence at  
every level**

The final principle for dealing constructively with individual differences in our society is that our conception of excellence must embrace many kinds of achievement at many levels. We must not adopt a narrow or constricting view of excellence. There is excellence in abstract intellectual activity, in art, in music, in managerial activities, in craftsmanship, in human relations, in technical work. Some kinds of excellence can be fostered by the educational system and other kinds must be fostered outside the educational system. Some kinds of excellence will reflect themselves in good grades and other kinds will not. There are some kinds of excellence which involve doing something well, and others which involve being a certain kind of person.

It is easier to bear in mind that there are different kinds of excellence than to bear in mind that there are different levels at which excellence may be achieved. But the latter point is extremely important. Our society cannot achieve greatness unless individuals at many levels of ability accept the need for high standards of performance and strive to achieve those standards within the limits possible for them. Democracy must foster a conception of excellence which may be applied to every level of ability and to every socially acceptable activity. The missile may blow up on its launching pad because the designer was incompetent or because the mechanic who adjusted the last valve was incompetent. The same is true of everything else in our society. We need excellent physicists and excellent mechanics. We need excellent cabinet members and excellent first-grade teachers. The whole tone and fiber of our society depends upon a pervasive and almost universal striving for good performance.

And you are not going to have that kind of morale, that kind of striving, that kind of alert and proud attention to performance unless you can sell the whole society on a conception of excellence that leaves room for everybody who is willing to strive for it—a conception of excellence which means

No expectations,  
no performance

Flexibility is  
the rule

that whoever I am or whatever I am doing, if I am engaged in a socially acceptable activity, some kind of excellence is within my reach.

Those, then, are the three principles which I consider basic for dealing constructively with individual differences in education: First, to avoid arrangements which unnecessarily diminish the dignity of the less able youngster; second, to preserve the principle of multiple chances; and third, to recognize the many kinds and levels of excellence which we need and must nourish in a healthy society.

In applying these principles to the school system, the important thing is to keep the fundamental goal in mind: to deal wisely and constructively with individual differences, not to ignore them, not to brush them aside, not to pretend that they do not exist.

And when you have got yourself into a position to deal with each youngster in terms of his own potentialities and his own level of competence, then you can justly require that every youngster be *stretched* in terms of his own capacities; he must be expected to strive to the limit of performance of which he is capable; all high performance takes place within a framework of expectations, especially where young people are concerned. No expectations, no performance. We need not—indeed we must not—expect all of our youngsters to reach the same standard of performance. But we must expect that every youngster will strive to achieve the best that *he* is capable of achieving. If we do not expect it we are certain not to get it.

As to the down-to-earth practical arrangements which make it possible to deal with each youngster in terms of his ability, there are great differences of opinion among teachers. Many favor a certain amount of acceleration, that is, grade skipping, but others are opposed to it. Most educators now accept the need for grouping by ability, that is, putting youngsters of the same level of aptitude into the same classroom, but again, others are opposed to this. I happen to favor the system recommended by James Conant—a system called *sectioning by subject matter*. In this system the youngster might be in the advanced section in mathematics, but not in history. And youngsters of all levels of ability attend the same school and join in the same school activities. There are no distinctions between them outside the classroom.

But it is important not to be an inflexible advocate of any one system. Flexibility is the rule. The important thing is to keep the objective in mind. The means should be fitted to the situation, and in some cases to the individual. It may be that acceleration will be useful in some cases, but injurious in others. It may be that in some schools, one kind of grouping by ability is natural and workable and in other schools another kind is workable.

In some big cities, special high schools for unusually gifted youngsters have proven effective. It is foolish to be dogmatic about these matters. The important thing is to find solutions somehow.

What we want is a system in which youngsters at every level of ability are stretched to their best performance and get the maximum education of which they are capable. We do not want any youngster to feel that he is unworthy or lacking in human dignity because of limitations in aptitude, but we do want to see our ablest youngsters encouraged, stimulated, and inspired to reach the heights of performance of which they are capable. I like to think that we are now sufficiently mature as a people to keep both of those objectives in mind and not to slight either of them.

## CURRENT READERS SERVICE

The following materials may be obtained free and postpaid by regular subscribers to *Current*. Circle items desired on the detachable card opposite, add your name and address, and mail.

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- 9 "Letters from the Communes," Introduction by Richard L. Walker, *New Leader*, 44 pages. Letters written by Chinese on the mainland to their overseas relatives describing life in Communist China today.
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- 12 "Expanding Horizons in World Economic Development," Willard Johnson, Committee for International Economic Growth, 28 pages. Outline of major trade, aid and international investment programs and policies of the past decade.
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 Sixth Column Quarterly, Box 1067 College Station, Durham, N.C. 27702, 31, 45 yr.  
 Time Quarterly, Box 7225 University Station, Austin 12, Q. 31, 50 yr.  
 Time, Rockefeller Center, New York 20, W. 336, 50 yr.  
 U.S. News and World Report, New York 10, W. 336, 50 yr.  
 Virginia Quarterly Review, Washington, Charlottesville, Va. Q. 50, 50 yr.

### NEWSPAPERS

- Denver Post, 350 15 St., Denver 2, 42¢ yr.  
 Financial Times, Bankers House, 10 Cannon St., London E.C. 4, 50.50 yr.  
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